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The moment life began was defined at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century by the mother's awareness of fetal 
movement. That moment was called quickening. The common 
law of England and of the early United States embraced 
quickening. Prior to quickening abortion was legally and 
socially benign. Abortion was a non-issue, for life was not 
considered to exist before the fetus was quick — which 
usually occurs in the fourth or fifth month of gestation. 
At the early stages of fetal development there was no 
difference between terminating pregnancy and simply 
restoring menses. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the quickening 
doctrine was no longer the key to abortion law. The 
doctrine was dismantled for a variety of reasons. The 
American Medical Association (AMA) played a major role in 
the movement to redefine the moment of animation and 
restrict abortions. The physicians' motivation was not 
concern for the fetus. The physicians gained status and 
power from the restriction of abortion; they emerged from 
iv 
the century as the only abortion authority. Physicians 
alone were able to sanction abortions. 
Changes occurred in the nineteenth century that 
increased the sense of urgency of the physicians' campaign. 
They utilized sensitive issues to persuade state 
legislatures to act. The main issues included a shift in 
the women seeking abortions and disparities in the 
population trend. In the 1840s there was an upsurge of 
married women in the upper classes having abortions. 
Abortion was no longer for the shamed single women. That 
trend combined with the increasing number of births among 
the lower class and foreign born to concern native America 
that they were going to be outbred. The physicians 
capitalized on eugenics and collective fear among the most 
powerful section of the population — the law makers. 
Religious disparities in the population growth also 
concerned the primarily Protestant physicians. The fear and 
distaste is clear in their rhetoric. 
Physicians were empowered by the sole ability to grant 
abortions, emerged as primary care givers, and successfully 
lobbied state legislatures for the alterations in law that 
allowed them to fill those roles. The common law quickening 
doctrine was transformed until a near prohibition on 
abortion existed by the 1880s. The termination of legal 
abortions fueled by the AMA lasted for nearly a century. 
v 
Introduction 
In the early 1800s written guides and folklore supplied 
women with methods to terminate pregnancy. In 1810, an 
article written by Joseph Brevitt provided multiple means 
for a woman to restore menses. The process was called the 
"restoration of menses" as opposed to abortion. The concept 
of abortion was nonexistent for Americans in the early 
nineteenth century. Pregnancy was not considered to exist 
until the fetus was able to move and the mother was aware of 
such activity. From that moment the woman was quick with 
child. Before the instance of quickening the woman's 
condition was indistinguishable from the absence of 
menstruation. Terminating gestation was not at all criminal 
prior to quickening. Law and society did not recognize 
fetal life before that moment of animation.1 
By the late nineteenth century, women were being 
prosecuted for seeking abortions along with the people 
providing the procedure. Pregnancy existed from the moment 
of conception according to legal authorities. Interrupting 
gestation gradually became illegal, and courts sentenced 
1
 Joseph Brevitt, Female Medical Repository (Baltimore, 
1810), 46-47. 
1 
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women and abortionists. The climate concerning abortion in 
the United States was clearly transformed during the 
nineteenth century. 
In an eighty-year period the transformation of abortion 
law was complete. It shifted from nonrestrictive to almost 
completely prohibitive in character. There was no law 
addressing abortion at the country's inception. 
Legislatures began altering the toleration of abortion in 
the 1820s; by the 1880s, physicians were essentially the 
only people able to sanction a legal abortion. The forces 
driving the metamorphosis included racism, class bias, 
eugenics, nativism, and the ambition of the American Medical 
Association. 
As in other areas of law, North American colonists 
adopted the English common law concerning abortion. The 
common law maintained that animation was the crucial moment 
of gestation. Common belief held that animation occurred 
when the mother noticed fetal movement. The awareness of 
movement signified that the mother was "quick" with child — 
officially carrying a child with a soul. Based on that 
theory of animation, the quickening doctrine guided common 
law. According to the doctrine, abortion prior to 
quickening was equated with simply restoring a woman's 
menses. Before that magic moment, people considered 
pregnancy something blocking the woman's menstrual cycle. 
Restoring menses under such circumstances was not criminal, 
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nor did a negative social stigma accompany the action. Even 
after quickening, abortions were simply misdemeanors.2 
The newly formed United States firmly accepted the 
quickening doctrine. The 1812 Massachusetts Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its validity in the case of Commonwealth v. 
Bangs.3 The court ruled that without evidence of 
quickening, the abortionist was not guilty — even of a 
simple misdemeanor. A crucial aspect of the common law 
fortified by Bangs was that the woman was immune from any 
legal complications. The person performing the abortion or 
administering the abortifacient was the only party 
potentially accountable at law. The early law of the United 
States was committed to a woman's immunity in abortion cases 
— her guilt was not an issue in instances of self-induced 
abortion or for seeking abortive services. The legal system 
also strongly supported the legality of abortions prior to 
quickening. 
The adherence to quickening changed as the United 
States matured. Connecticut passed the first piece of 
legislation that addressed abortion in 1821. Other states 
followed Connecticut's lead. The initial phase of 
legislation mentioning abortion addressed the issue as part 
of a broad criminal code. The laws resembled anti-poisoning 
2Lionel H. Frankel, Law, Power, and Personal Freedom 
(St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1975), 379. 
Commonwealth v. Bangs (Massachusetts, 1812). 
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laws, maintained the woman's immunity, and acted as 
protective legislation. The first series of laws did not 
counter the legality of abortions before quickening; it 
simply sought to protect women from potentially negligent 
abortionists. The quickening doctrine and perceptions of 
abortion were altered as a variety of societal forces 
developed. 
In the early-to-mid-nineteenth century there were 
several phenomena that occurred almost simultaneously. The 
emerging factors were mutually reinforcing. One major 
factor was the significant increase in the visibility of 
abortion services. Abortionists and abortifacients were 
initially confined to the private realm. Self abortions at 
home using home-grown concoctions were typical. 
Commercialization led to a thriving new market in which some 
abortionists prospered significantly. With 
commercialization, new patent medicines appeared based on 
traditional herbal remedies. Commercialization also meant 
the advent of the mail order abortifacient business. 
Eventually even devices intended to procure abortion were 
sold via the newspaper. In addition to frequent newspaper 
advertisements, urban areas were inundated with circulars. 
Commercialization furthered the transformation of abortion 
from a private home issue into a public practice. 
Determining the number of women who terminated their 
pregnancies is difficult given the absences of detailed 
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records and the ease with which abortion could be privately 
procured. Prior to the surge of commercialization, evidence 
of abortion is apparent in the number of home medical guides 
that discussed methods of inducing abortion, the frequency 
of remedies passed in cookbooks, and the testimony of 
medical figures. During the commercial phase, the great 
fortunes amassed by abortionists serve as evidence of the 
practice. Testimony concerning the increase in number of 
abortions was quite common among physicians of the period. 
The doctors supporting the founding of the AMA compiled 
reports that estimated abortions in some areas averaged one 
in every four live births. Trends in population growth also 
indicate that family limitation was fairly common 
particularly among native segments of society." The rise in 
estimated abortions coupled with the increased visibility of 
abortion services and concerns about disparities in 
population growth heightened American sensitivity to 
abortion. These factors also provided physicians with 
ammunition to elevate their status. They rallied around 
abortion and highlighted the changing trends in American 
society. 
The fact that married, upper-class women were seeking 
abortion services increased sensitivity to the abortion 
issue — particularly given the disparity in procreation 
"Robert V. Wells, Uncle Sam's Family; Issues and 
Perspectives on American Demographic History (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1985), 38. 
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rates between foreign newcomers and native white Anglo Saxon 
Protestant, (WASP), America. Physicians used those 
sensitivities to further their campaign. They also 
reevaluated the traditional acceptance that life began at 
the moment of quickening. They denounced the doctrine and 
adopted moral rhetoric. This denunciation propelled the 
physicians into the prominent status of being not only 
medically knowledgeable, but also morally superior to those 
medical "quacks" still willing to act as abortionists. 
Physicians participating in the AMA referred to themselves 
as "regulars"; medical authorities not involved in parallel 
medical and educational pursuits were called "irregulars." 
Rhetoric almost exclusively identified irregulars in female 
terms and was filled with contempt. 
The alteration in the attitudes of physicians combined 
with their ambition to involve legislatures in rectifying 
the abortion situation made an impact on abortion laws. 
Physicians successfully worked to alter public opinion. Not 
only did they write state legislatures and submit abortion 
reports that they compiled, but they also bombarded the 
press. The press began to sensationalize abortion deaths, 
even though they were financially supported in part by the 
abortifacient advertisements in their papers. Such coverage 
alone did not propel state legislatures to revise abortion 
codes, but it helped to create an environment that was not 
publicly opposed to such measures. The physicians' ambition 
7 
seems to have had the greatest influence on the evolution of 
abortion legislation protecting women from dangerous 
abortifacients to prohibiting the practice unless sanctioned 
by a physician. 
The "regulars" were motivated based on a need to rally 
around a topic that would elevate their status. Abortion 
became an issue that raised people's concerns. Originally 
it was not considered a deviant act, opposed to God's law, 
or contemptible. Once the physicians' campaign stripped 
quickening of significance, abortion was redefined as a 
moral issue. The physicians spearheaded the move away from 
quickening and embraced the prohibition of abortion at law. 
Social factors aided the physicians. Social trends such as 
the decline in population, the disparity in native and 
foreign birthrates, and the increase in abortions among 
married women were repeatedly highlighted by physicians 
addressing abortion. Ethnic, racial and class solidarity 
united some people, most importantly men sitting as 
governmental representatives, in favor of the physicians' 
campaign and concerns. The idea that women were rejecting 
motherhood to pursue fashion and leisure was also promoted 
in their writings. Abortion facilitated the move away from 
traditional roles. The deviation reinforced the problem in 
class and racial procreative disparities. The physicians 
were activists against abortion. They operated their 
campaign with insight regarding the concerns most likely to 
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incite people against abortion. They wielded the most 
explosive possible weapon against legal abortion. Once 
illegal, physicians would not have to struggle with the 
Hippocratic Oath, knowledge of animation, or competition 
from those willing to provide their patients with any 
service desired, including pregnancy termination. 
The campaign to halt the practice of abortion through 
legislative means was partially successful. Legislation was 
framed in a manner that restricted abortions, unless 
sanctioned by physicians. Though legislatures installed 
anti-abortion laws in the United States, the nineteenth-
century transformation did not render the practice extinct. 
Physicians successfully emerged as the dominant medical care 
givers. The medical profession was also able to call the 
clergy and legislators to assist in the alteration of common 
law notions concerning animation and abortion. It was 
transformed into a public issue, and those three groups of 
moral authority figures were vocalizing the negative aspects 
of terminating pregnancies. Governing authorities were 
willing to temporarily accept a legal prohibition of 
abortions. Abortion remained an alternative for pregnant 
women, though the practice was again decommercialized. 
Instead it became a private, underground phenomenon during 
the majority of the twentieth century. 
Social and Legal Acceptance of Abortion 
The Common law passed on from England to the colonies 
did not discourage abortion in any way- Restoring one's 
menses was not equated with abortion. Terminating a pre-
quickened pregnancy was legally and socially acceptable; the 
act was considered to be so benign that it was not a public 
issue. Abortion existed exclusively in the private realm 
unitl the mid 1800s. Methods of abortion, however, did 
circulate among women. 
Conversation and experience provided women the means to 
increase their understanding of their bodies. Midwives were 
a main factor in the spread of information useful to women. 
Women in the nineteenth century shared their wisdom fairly 
openly with each other. Historian Carroll Smith-Rosenberg 
declared after an examination of the Schlesinger Library's 
cook book collection that "women collected and exchanged 
recipes for medicines as routinely as they did for pies and 
cookies.115 Women were urged to understand the importance of 
menstruation — it was the area of their physical life taken 
5Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions of 
Gender in Victorian America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1985), 228. 
9 
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taken most seriously- Women and their medical advisors 
believed that the absence of menstrual flow (amenorrhea), an 
excessively heavy flow (dysmenorrhea), and menstrual cramps 
(menorrhagia) could lead to serious illness and even death. 
Because of the importance assigned menstruation, women 
had access to methods that could restore normality to their 
menstrual cycle. A large portion of such information was 
dedicated to the restoration of menses. Given the absence 
of pregnancy tests, amenorrhea and pregnancy were 
indistinguishable until the mother was aware of fetal 
movement. Women used abortifacients to restore menses in 
either situation. The identical treatment of the 
indistinguishable conditions meant that enforcing laws 
concerning abortion would be extremely difficult. The 
intention of administering abortifacients was impossible to 
prove. Once quickening occurred, the mother was still the 
only party to know unless she shared that information. 
Abortions were accessible to women in North America 
prior to the commercialization of the abortion industry. 
There were three main types of abortion — physical, 
chemical, and operative. All had potential for both success 
and danger. When pondering the danger of abortion, it must 
be considered relative to the perils inherent in childbirth 
prior to advanced medical knowledge. Particularly early in 
gestation, the risk of induced miscarriage seemed less 
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dangerous and frightening than actual childbirth and other 
complications associated with pregnancy.6 
The operative method became more frequent with 
urbanization and commercialization. For Native Americans 
and early Americans, the first two categories were more 
readily accessible and required less assistance. Operative 
methods were usually performed at "lying in houses" and the 
recovery period was monitored. Lying in houses were 
boarding houses where women underwent the abortive procedure 
and spent the recovery period. Physical and chemical 
methods were much more private, and less obvious to the 
community at large. Physical methods of inducing a 
miscarriage include hot baths, heavy and prolonged exercise, 
adjustments and manipulations altering the circulatory flow 
to promote uterine contractions, and violent procedures 
targeting the lower abdominal region. The physical methods 
could produce abortion, though it was difficult to balance 
the activity to cause disruption of the pregnancy while 
6Janet Farrell Brodie, Contraception and Abortion in 
Nineteenth Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 41-42; Brodie's work is an excellent piece on 
the trends in the nineteenth century; she emphasizes the 
contraception movement, though her research on the 
anti-abortion movement is quite revealing. James C. Mohr's 
Abortion in America is also a well written source about 
abortion policy in the nineteenth century. Mohr's examination 
is soley of abortion; contraception is not adressed to any 
significant extent. Mohr's examination of abortion policy 
extends beyong the decline of the quickening doctrine and the 
ramifications of that alteration. Mohr considers the 
evolution of the polarized nature of the abortion debate. 
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maintaining the health of the woman.7 Chemical methods 
could also prove damaging, even fatal to the woman, if 
caution was not used in determining dose and frequency of 
the various concoctions. 
Chemical abortifacients fall into one of four 
categories — purgatives, intestinal and pelvis irritants, 
uterine contraction stimulants, and systemic poisons. 
Purgatives included aloe, castor oil, and croton oil. 
Pennyroyal oils, savin, rue, and tansy could act as 
intestinal and pelvis irritants. Quinine, ergot, and 
pituitary extract were used to stimulate uterine 
contractions. The systemic poisons included lead salts, 
apoil, kerosene, mercury salts, oil of wintergreen, and 
nitrobenzene. Ideally, systemic poisons would act more 
quickly on the fetus than on the woman.8 
Operative methods were designed to dislodge or remove 
the fetus by entering the uterus through the vaginal canal. 
Cutterage was a method of scraping the uterine walls, and it 
became increasingly more damaging to the woman as gestation 
progressed. Following the third month of pregnancy, 
dilation of the cervix was a possible abortive method, as 
was puncturing the amniotic sac. Early attempts at such 
procedures reportedly included the use of umbrella ribs, 
7Harold Rosen, Abortion in America: Medical, 
Psychiatric, Legal Anthropological. and Religious 
Considerations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 6. 
8Ibid. 
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darning needles, hat pins, wire, and wood. Given the nature 
of the utensils and the tendency towards infection, 
operative methods were the least safe.9 When stories of 
abortions that led to a woman's gruesome death were 
publicized, they were frequently of the operative variety. 
Herbs were the most readily available abortifacients. 
Exposure to the Native American community and the African-
American slave community increased colonists' knowledge of 
herbal solutions.10 Nicholas Culpeper revealed twelve 
botanicals associated with miscarriage in The English 
Physician and Complete Herbal. The twelve herbs mentioned 
were common to gardens in New England, and were identified 
as herbs to "bring on a woman's courses." The preparations 
included calamint, sage, honey suckle, pennyroyal, common 
groundpine, brake fern, bistort or snakeweed, and gladwin.11 
Pennyroyal was used by some Native American women and was 
colloquially referred to as "squammint." American medical 
plant authority Charles Millspaugh said pennyroyal "will 
often bring on the menses nicely; and, if combined with a 
gill of brewer's yeast, it frequently acts well as an 
9Ibid., 7-8. 
10Though there are limited accounts of slave women's 
experience with abortion, there are descriptions of the use 
of cotton root by slaves to procure abortion. Various 
physicians and plantation owners comment on the abortion 
phenomena in Herbert George Gutman, The Black Family in 
Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1976), 80-82. 
"Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 42. 
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abortivant, should the intender not be too late with her 
prescription.1,12 
Other sources indicated the abortive properties of the 
mint species including savory, spearmint, peppermint, 
rosemary, marjoram, European lavender, catnip, American 
horsemint, balm, horehound, and hyssop.13 Fourteen of the 
most toxic plants in United States' folklore were labeled 
abortifacients. They included foxglove, white and black 
hellebore, may apple, boneset herb, the crowfoot family, 
mistletoe, bloodroot, and castor bean. Some Native American 
tribes used "black cohosh," a member of the crowfoot family, 
and perhaps the most effective of the herbal preparations. 
In the late 1600s in Middlesex, Massachusetts, there were 
four noted attempts of producing abortion with savin boiled 
in beer. Of those attempts one proved effective.14 
Once a woman began to suspect menstrual obstruction, 
including pregnancy, she typically initiated a certain 
routine. She began by soaking her feet in hot, herbed water 
or drinking herbal teas. The second step was possibly to 
breathe herbal vapors followed by the application of "herbal 
mixtures or mustard plasters to her breasts." Participating 
in slightly taxing physical activity was also a part of the 
"Charles Millspaugh, Medical plants 2 vols. 
(Philadelphia: John C. Yorston, 1892), reprinted as American 
Medical Plants (New York: Dover, 1974), 463-464. 
"People also attributed the mint species with the ability 
to prevent conception and remove a dead fetus. 
14Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 43. 
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standard routine. If menstruation did not follow, the 
routine was repeated, though the amounts of herbs and 
exercise were increased. The process could continue for a 
few months or until pregnancy was certain. At that point 
the procedure became more complicated. By the seventeenth 
century, it became increasingly common to restore menses 
using cervical instruments. After another hundred years 
women were using slippery elm bark to procure 
abortion.15 
The accessibility of abortifacients and the frequency 
of their mention in herbal guides and home medical manuals 
indicate that, though a private act, abortion was imbedded 
in American life. Just as abortions were feasible based on 
the availability of abortifacients, there was not a single 
piece of legislation deterring or regulating abortion until 
1821. Before the advent of pregnancy tests, the absence of 
menses and pregnancy were indistinguishable early in 
gestation. Both relied upon the same remedies. The shared 
symptoms of amenorrhea and pregnancy made enforcing abortion 
laws near impossible once such legislation existed. Proving 
the intent of the person administering an abortifacient was 
critical — for anti-abortion legislation was penned to 
prevent the termination of pregnancy, not the restoration of 
menses. 
lsIbid. , 42. 
The Quickening in Early Legislation 
In matters of law, the doctrine of quickening was the 
essential moment in the development of a fetus. The 
doctrine held that the fetus became viable upon quickening. 
Quickening was the moment of animation, the first moment 
that the mother could feel fetal movement. The doctrine was 
developed by theologian Thomas Aquinas. His philosophy of 
quickening determined that the mother's awareness of 
movement signified the moment that a soul entered the 
fetus.16 English common law embraced Aquinas's theory. 
Common law was then transplanted into the North American 
colonies and influenced the U.S. legal system for two 
centuries.17 
In his definitive Commentaries, on the common law, 
William Blackstone claimed that "Life begins in the 
contemplation of law as soon as the infant is able to stir 
in the mother's womb."18 Under the common law abortion 
16John T. Noonan, Jr. , "Aquinas on Abortion" in St. Thomas 
Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1988), 245. 
17Though quickening was removed from most state statutes 
as a full prohibition of abortion was adopted, as late as 1956 
there was still mention of quickening as a distinction in 
Mississippi. 
16 
17 
prior to quickening was not a crime at all. After 
quickening the act of abortion was considered a misdemeanor. 
The term "criminal abortion" applied strictly to post-
quickened terminations and the crime was minor. According 
to Blackstone, 
If a woman is quick with child, and, by a potion, 
or otherwise, killeth in her womb, or if any one 
beat her, where by the child dieth in her body, 
and she is delivered of a dead child, this, though 
not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or 
manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look 
upon this offence in quite so atrocious light, but 
merely as a heinous misdemeanor. But if the child 
be born alive, and afterwards die in consequence 
of the potion or beating, it will be 
murder.19 
The most significant points of Blackstone's statement 
include the absence of any scorn toward pre-quickened 
abortions and the party responsible for the act. Because 
the woman does not come under fire for the abortion, the 
common law resembled and, once codified, became protective 
legislation. The law monitored the abortionist, not the 
mother. This point is essential to understand the evolution 
of abortion legislation. Later, as the burden shifted and 
the mother became the guilty party, the legal environment 
18Lader, Abortion (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1966), 78. 
"William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1861), 129, and 
note; for a concise discussion of the common law in England 
see Amos Dean, Principles of Medical Jurisprudence: Designed 
for the Professions of Law and Medicine (Albany: Gould, 
Banks, and Company, 1854). 
18 
was prime for the prohibition of abortion rather than simply 
the regulation of abortionists. 
Another significance of the quickening doctrine is the 
way it allocates the power to terminate gestation. If the 
critical moment at law is when the mother feels fetal 
movement, then the mother has a knowledge that no one else 
is capable of knowing. She alone could make that 
determination. Medicine held that the magic moment occurred 
in the fourth or fifth month of gestation. Until that 
moment the mother might easily mistake pregnancy with 
amenorrhea. Midwives, medical practitioners, partners, and 
the community at large could not know when the fetus was 
legally viable. There were no pregnancy tests, simply the 
word of the woman, and this proved a tremendous impediment 
to enforcing the evolving legislation. As regular 
physicians began to alter their philosophy about terminating 
pregnancies, a pregnant woman could opt to seek treatment 
for menstrual blockage without disclosing her suspicion of 
pregnancy and if enough time had passed, not revealing 
quickening. Though women lacked legal and social equality, 
in instances of pregnancy they possessed power, for only 
they had the knowledge concerning fetal movement. 
As mothers became culpable and physicians reexamined 
the accepted significance of quickening, legislatures 
altered the doctrine beginning in the 1820s and extending 
into the 1880s. The medical profession rethought quickening 
19 
and regulars began to scoff at the notion that animation 
occurred when the mother felt movement — as opposed to 
animation at the moment of conception. The changes in 
perception about the advent of fetal life and culpability 
were major factors in the evolution of abortion legislation 
leading to a general prohibition. When women were 
considered guilty for pursuing termination options, then 
abortion legislation was no longer intended to simply 
protect women from shady abortionists. Prohibition of the 
practice was not the intent of initial abortion legislation; 
it was only an option once women themselves were subject to 
criminal prosecution for terminating their pregnancy. 
In 1812 the Massachusetts Supreme Court firmly upheld 
the common law tradition of quickening as the critical 
distinction in the case of Isaiah Bangs. In Commonwealth v. 
Bangs, Bangs was charged with administering an abortifacient 
to his wife. The abortifacient that he administered 
successfully terminated the pregnancy. Bangs was acquitted 
based on his wife's prequickened condition. Since the 
pregnancy had not quickened, it was impossible for Bangs to 
have known if his wife was indeed pregnant.20 Without 
certainty of pregnancy it was not possible to determine the 
intent of the person administering an abortifacient. The 
same potion was able to procure abortion or cure amenorrhea. 
20Commonwealth v. Bangs 9 Mass. 369 (1812). 
The case set an important precedent in U.S. abortion law. 
The Bangs decision entrenched the idea that pre-quickened 
abortions were legally acceptable. Strong in the first half 
of the 1800's, this interpretation faded at different points 
in several states after mid century. 
Initial legislation addressing the question of abortion 
occurred between 1821 and 1841 as a response to concerns 
that some abortifacients were too dangerous for women to 
ingest. During this twenty-year period, one federal 
territory and ten states passed abortion legislation of some 
variety. The General Assembly of Connecticut passed its 
first abortion statute in 1821. The law stated that 
Every person who shall, willfully and maliciously, 
administer to, or cause to be administered to, or 
taken by, any person or persons, any deadly 
poison, or other noxious and destructive 
substance, with an intention him, her, or them, 
thereby to murder, or thereby to cause or procure 
the miscarriage of any woman, then being quick 
with child, and shall be thereof duly convicted, 
shall suffer imprisonment, in Newgate prison, 
during his natural life, or for such other term as 
the court having cognizance of the offence shall 
determine.21 
The Connecticut statute more closely resembled a measure to 
curb dangerous poisonings and not an attempt to strike at 
the legality abortion or the quickening doctrine. The 
concern centered on poisons which, when consumed, posed as 
threat as serious to the mother as it did to the fetus. 
21The Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut , 
1821 (Hartford, 1821), 152-153. 
21 
Historian James C- Mohr declared that the law "did not 
proscribe abortion per say; it declared illegal one 
particular method of attempting to induce an abortion...."22 
The law did not mention operative and mechanical methods of 
producing abortion. 
Perhaps the most significant point in the legislation 
is that it maintained the quickening distinction. The 
administration of poisons was only illegal if the woman was 
quick with child. The person held culpable by the law was 
not the woman carrying the fetus, but the person responsible 
for administering the poison. By targeting the provider of 
the potion and not the woman seeking the abortion the law 
was an attempt to protect women from people willing to sell 
dangerous substances as abortifacients. Since the 
administer was the target and other methods of abortion 
remained untouched, the 1821 statute did indeed closely 
resemble anti-poisoning legislation. An objection to 
abortion was not the main motivation behind Connecticut's 
law — instead it was a public health issue. It was an 
attempt to protect women quick with child from those willing 
to sell and administer potentially fatal poisons.23 
Missouri and Illinois passed similar legislation in 1825 and 
22Mohr, Abortion in America; The Origins and Evolution 
of a National Policy. 1800-1900 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), 22. 
"Laws of Connecticut, 152-153; for an interesting 
discussion of the health issue see Fred M. Frottock, Abortion 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 60. 
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1827 respectively. They both dealt with abortions induced 
by poisons and acted as protective legislation. The laws 
varied from Connecticut's in that the quickening distinction 
was not included. Though the law did not explicitly lay out 
the quickening doctrine, this was a function of assumption 
rather than a departure from the doctrine. The intention of 
the person administering the poison was crucial to 
determining if a crime had been committed. In order to 
prove that abortion was the intent of the person 
administering the potion, they had to know if the patient 
was pregnant. In order to know that the woman was pregnant, 
she obviously would already have felt fetal movement and 
thus be quick with child. The word "quickening" is not 
present in either state's first statute, but by outlining 
that the administer was only culpable if intending to 
procure abortion, quickening is an issue — abortion could 
not be the intention if the woman was not quick with child 
since quickening was the only certain confirmation of 
pregnancy. Neither state was rejecting the distinction.24 
The state of New York passed legislation in 1828 which, 
like Connecticut's law, seemed protective in nature and 
codified English common law. The New York statute did not 
24Laws of the State of Missouri; Revised and Digested by 
Authority of the General Assembly (St. Louis, 1825), 283; 
Illinois Revised Code of 1827, 130-131, as cited in Eugene 
Quay, "Justifiable Abortion," The Georgetown Law Review 49:3 
(Spring, 1961): 466. 
address abortions occurring before quickening, nor did it 
target the woman herself. The law did prohibit abortions 
induced by any method after quickening. The person 
performing an abortion after quickening was guilty of second 
degree manslaughter if the abortion was successful or if the 
woman died. If the abortion was unsuccessful and the mother 
survived the procedure, then the abortionist was not guilty 
of anything. The attempt itself was not a criminal act, and 
the woman was not culpable. In this sense the New York law 
has a protective nature and not a strict anti-abortion tone. 
New York's law served as a model for other states' 
legislation as it distinguished punishment based on 
quickening and provided an exception.25 
The New York law read 
Every person who shall willfully administer to any 
pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, substance, or 
thing whatever, or shall use or employ any 
instrument or other means whatever, with intent 
thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such 
woman, unless the same shall have been necessary 
to preserve the life of such woman, or shall have 
been advised by two physicians to be necessary for 
that purpose; shall, upon conviction, be punished 
by imprisonment in a county jail no more than one 
year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.26 
The clause sanctioning physicians to determine necessity 
introduced a new concept in American law. It allowed 
25Frankel, Law, Power, and Personal Freedom. 381. 
26The Revised Statutes of New York... 1828-1835 Inclusive 
(Albany, 1836), I, 578, as cited in Mohr, Abortion in America, 
27. 
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medical professionals to make a therapeutic exception. That 
power grew in significance as physicians lobbied for an 
unconditional ban on abortion and rethought the quickening 
distinction. The result of the therapeutic exception was a 
paradox in the physicians' theory. With the complete 
prohibition of abortion besides the therapeutic exception, 
the power to seek an abortion shifted drastically. The 
regular physicians had a great deal of influence on the 
introduction and passage of medical related legislation. In 
New York the regulars oversaw the appointment of members to 
the standing committee on medical practice through the 
speaker of the assembly.27 
The second piece of legislation addressing abortion in 
Connecticut occurred in 1830, eight years after the first. 
The first law resembled an anti-poisoning statute as an 
attempt to address a public health issue, not to strike at 
the legality of abortion. The 1830 bill included a section 
that made abortion induced by instruments after quickening a 
crime. The punishment for such an act was seven to ten 
years in prison. Again the party liable was the person 
performing the act. Interestingly, the lawmakers determined 
the standard sentence for performing post-quickening 
abortion with an instrument was less severe. Those breaking 
the anti-poisoning statute faced a life sentence, though the 
27Mary K. Zimmerman, Passage Through Abortion: The 
Personal and Social Reality of Women's Experiences (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1977), 8; Mohr, Abortion in America, 37. 
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law deemed seven to ten years appropriate for mechanical 
abortionists. Abortions before quickening were still legal, 
regardless of the method attempted.28 
The law was still a protective maneuver rather than a 
response to a strong objection against abortion. The intent 
of the law's framers was to protect women from the 
potentially untrustworthy abortionists in the field. 
Neither piece of legislation deviated from the common law 
quickening distinction, and both allowed the option of 
abortion prior to quickening. The lawmakers still held to 
the notion that animation occurred at quickening. It was 
the physicians, not the lawmakers, who initially challenged 
that notion. 
Ohio passed another piece of abortion-related 
legislation that attempted to uphold public safety. The 
1834 bill made abortion attempts that resulted in the 
woman's or fetus' death after quickening a felony. The law 
also stated that abortion was a misdemeanor without 
mentioning quickening. The section addressing abortion was 
included with clauses designed to reduce potential abuses 
by physicians. One such clause forbade the prescription of 
medicine while intoxicated. The Ohio law falls into the 
28The Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut, 
1830 (Hartford, 1830), 255. 
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category of early abortion legislation designed to protect 
people from physicians.29 
The quickening distinction remained either explicitly 
or implicitly based on the need to prove intent. In 1835 
Missouri legislators toughened their 1825 law that dealt 
with poisonings. The statute inserted a section concerning 
the use of instruments to induce abortion after animation. 
Instrumental abortions became offenses equal to poisonings. 
Abortions prior to quickening were made a misdemeanor. This 
was almost completely unenforceable since to have an 
abortion one must first be pregnant. The only way to 
determine pregnancy was through quickening, and abortions 
were identical to treatments used for amenorrhea. An 1837 
Arkansas law equated postquickening abortions with 
manslaughter but maintained the common law stance accepting 
pre-quickened abortions. In 1839 Mississippi made 
postquickening abortions second-degree manslaughter though 
pre-quickened abortions remained perfectly legal. The same 
year the territory of Iowa passed an anti-poisoning law that 
resembled the first piece of legislation in Connecticut. In 
1841 Alabama made all abortions after quickening a criminal 
offense. The statute did not use language of the 
"Statutes of the State of Ohio (Columbus, 1841), 252. 
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quickening doctrine though it prohibited abortions of 
"pregnant women" which was synonymous with "quickened.1,30 
In 1840 Maine enacted the strictest abortion law to 
date. At the same time the legislature introduced the bill, 
significant changes were occurring in the population. 
Physicians were also reevaluating their definition of 
abortion. The Eastman-Everett Act of 1840 declared the 
abortion of any pregnant woman was a crime. The law 
pertained to any pregnant woman — pregnancy defined as 
carrying a quickened child or an unquick fetus. It diverged 
from the idea that pregnancies before quickening were not 
the same as those afterwards. The statute applied to all 
methods of inducing abortion. Like New York's law, it 
contained a therapeutic exception. The party facing 
punishment was the abortionist — a $1,000 fine or a year in 
jail if the procedure failed. If the fetus was aborted, the 
jail time increased to five years.31 
The Supreme Court of Maine tested the Eastman-Everett 
Act in 1853. The case illustrates the problems of 
3
°Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri (1835), 168; 
T.J. Fox Alden and J.A. Van Hoesen, A Digest of the Laws of 
Mississippi (New York, 1839), 867; Acts Passed 
at the Annual Session of the General Assembly of the State of 
Alabama, 1840-1841 (Tuscaloosa, 1841), 143; Mohr, Abortion in 
America, 38-43, provides a synopses of the law of the various 
states and territories; Wendell W. Waters, Compulsory 
Parenthood (McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 86. 
31The Revised Statutes of the State of Maine, Passed 
October 22
 r 1840 (Augusta, 1841), 686. 
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enforcement that accompanied any abortion legislation prior 
to the sophistication of pregnancy tests and medical 
knowledge of women's cycles. Though the act sought to alter 
the common law distinction of quickening, there was another 
point that allowed the release of abortionist Mr. Smith. 
Justice John Tenney determined that though Smith caused the 
woman's death by inserting a metal wire into her uterus, 
Smith's intention was integral to the court's decision. He 
could have meant to treat some condition other than 
pregnancy, according to Justice Tenney. The intention of 
the abortionist was an essential ingredient in an abortion 
trial — one that added to the difficulty of convicting 
abortion providers. Though the law was the most stringent 
to date in the United States, it was nearly impossible to 
enforce.32 It was difficult to prove that an abortionist 
was treating an unquickened woman for pregnancy. Without 
proof of intention, there was very little chance that the 
court would be willing to convict an abortionist. 
All of the aforementioned states' legislation 
concerning abortion was a portion of larger bills addressing 
crime. The abortion issue had not been a subject that 
received a great deal of attention as a single issue. 
Reaction to the laws was nonexistant in the media — 
32Asa Redington, Reports of Cases in Law and Equity 
Determined by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, vol.XXXIII 
(Hollowell, Maine, 1853), 48-61, cited in Mohr, Abortion in 
America, 42. 
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religious figures were equally silent.33 The populace at 
large and the church leaders were not focused on abortion as 
an issue. Instead, the debate concerning abortion was 
unique to the legal and medical professions. The laws 
emerged as a reaction to the potential abuses among people 
who were trusted to provide medical attention. Regular 
physicians were interested in controlling medical practices. 
The Hippocratic Oath and the reduction of competition from 
physicians of the irregular variety fueled the regulars' 
desire. Both motives become apparent when examining their 
efforts in the nineteenth century. The legislators were 
interested as a matter of public health and, as apparent in 
New York, were directly influenced by regulars controlling 
post appointments. 
All of the legislation detailed thus far targeted the 
abortionist. The woman was not culpable; the trusted 
medical figure was. Women's freedom from legal guilt 
stemmed from legislatures' desires to protect, not prosecute 
women. The laws sought to protect women and regulate the 
medical community for questionable practices. Since 
abortions were believed to become more dangerous as 
gestation advanced, the quickening distinction fits nicely 
into the public safety issues in abortion clauses. Not only 
did quickening work into the public health issue, quickening 
had not yet been dismantled in a campaign by regular 
33Mohr, Abortion in America, 42
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physicians that viewed pregnancy as an uninterrupted process 
resulting in human life. 
By 1840, only ten of the nation's twenty-six states had 
addressed abortion through legislation. Half of those made 
abortion after quickening a crime. The other five did not 
explicitly mention quickening as a distinction, but some 
implied quickening through the term pregnant. All of the 
legislation was virtually unenforceable in terms of pre-
quickened abortions. A combination of factors, however, 
altered the course of abortion legislation in the second 
half of the ninteenth century. The factors included a shift 
in those women seeking abortions, the commercialization of 
abortifacients, the increased awareness of women about 
abortion options provided by "irregulars," a nativist fear 
of being outbred, and the efforts of professionalizing 
physicians — a category which has numerous layers. Those 
changes created an environment that accepted increased legal 
restrictions on abortion. 
The Fear of Growing Population Disparities 
The population of the United States declined 
significantly during the nineteenth century. Among white 
native-born married women, the birth rate declined forty-
nine percent during the century. The average number of 
children dropped from 7.04 children to 3.56 children by 
1900.34 Horatio Robinson Storer determined that in 1846 
there was an abortion for every ten pregnancies carried 
full-term. He then determined that only ten years later the 
number jumped to one abortion for every four births. He 
also stressed that, "innumerable ones occur that are never 
recorded."35 By 1898 the Michigan board of Health reported 
that a third of pregnancies in the state ended in abortion. 
The Board estimated that married, wealthy women composed 
seventy to eighty percent of the abortion clientele.36 
The birth rate declined with more proclivity in the 
1840s than it did during any other decade in the nineteenth 
century. This change influenced the shifting attitudes 
34Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 2. 
35Horatio R. Storer, and Franklin Fiske Heard, Criminal 
Abortion: Its Nature, Evidence, and its Law, (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1865), 34. 
36Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct, 221. 
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concerning the need for abortion legislation. The 
statistical evidence on decreasing births was used by the 
AMA and concerned physicians to bolster support for abortion 
prohibition. They were able to use population concerns to 
support their success and boost the esteem of doctors as 
moral crusaders with the power to determine issues of life 
and death. The most remarkable language used by regular 
physicians concerned birth rate disparity between social 
classes, differing ethnicities, and even among different 
religious groups. Class bias, fear of racial extinction, 
and eugenics are all apparent in speeches and testimonies 
offered by the regular physicians. 
A recurring complaint of physicians was that women 
were more heavily influenced by fashion and leisure than by 
a desire to entrench themselves in motherhood. Carroll 
Smith-Rosenberg describes the underlying contradiction 
presented by such complaints. Bourgeois women were expected 
to present themselves in a manner that stood juxtaposed to 
the presentation expected of a woman immersed in the cult of 
True Womanhood. The Bourgeois woman was defined by society 
as educated, polished, active in social service, and 
sophisticated. They were to reinforce the class level of 
their husband and financial provider. They were also 
expected to limit their fertility. In contrast, women in 
the cult of True Womanhood were expected to be domestic, 
docile, and fertile — roles confined to the private sphere. 
33 
The emergence of the bourgeois matron meant that women 
themselves, especially as wives, threatened the traditional 
role assigned to women.37 Society expected two quite 
different functions of women. 
The bourgeois woman was bearing fewer children. 
Couples were postponing marriage until their mid-to late-
twenties, and there was a more conscious effort to space 
children at greater intervals. The educated, middle-and 
upper-class women were reducing their progeny. This 
reduction concerned physicians. The falling birth rate was 
problematic and scary to the pillars of bourgeois society-
The fear stemmed from disparity in the falling number of 
children — not all ethnicities and classes were 
experiencing similar reductions in the birth rate. Middle 
and upper-class white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were 
procreating less than others in the country. That disparity 
sparked an intense fear that the WASP in America was being 
outbred by the poor, the immigrants, and the non-
Protestants.38 The language makes it clear that this 
concern was major. Eugenics flood the rhetoric — there was 
a belief that the WASP population was the most worthy of 
procreation. One way to combat the problem was to prohibit 
abortions — if the lower classes were fruitful, the upper 
classes should have no other option but to bear children in 
37Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct, 225. 
38Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct, 223-225. 
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equal numbers. This prohibition appeared to be a logical 
solution given the shift in the abortion clientele. 
Abortion was no longer only for shamed, single women. It 
had spread into the very foundation of what WASP society 
deemed to be American excellence. 
In 1869 Dr. Hugh L. Hodge addressed the legal 
profession in a piece titled Foeticide. or Criminal 
Abortion. His intention was to procure abortion legislation 
by motivating the legal profession. The language in 
Foeticide is representative of typical presentations made by 
physicians involved in the movement. Hodge emphasized that 
abortion is "daily perpetuated in every part of the land, 
not only by the ignorant and degraded, but by those whose 
education and reputed moral worth and refinement had 
apparently raised them even above suspicion of vicious 
designs."39 Hodge's experience, also typical of his fellow 
regular physicians, indicated that the "artificial causes of 
abortion are frequent both in the married and unmarried, and 
more frequent in the better classes of society than among 
the poor."40 Hodge also argued that the new devotion to 
fashion and a decline in devotion to the Glory of God was a 
39Hugh L. Hodge, Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion: A 
Lecture Introductory to the Course on Obstetrics, and Diseases 
of Women and Children (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 1869), reprinted in eds. Charles Rosenberg and 
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Abortion in Nineteenth Century 
America (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 4-5. 
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broad societal trend. Abortion was an obvious and tragic 
symptom of this societal reprioritization. Hodge included 
testimony from obstetrician and former professor Dr. Gilbert 
who stated, "I have been called often upon by ladies of the 
most undoubted character, who very innocently suppose that 
it cannot be wrong to produce an abortion, so long as there 
is no quickening." Gilbert was shocked that high society 
and church women increasingly requested abortive services.41 
Another doctor with twenty-five years experience 
expressed his fear that abortion by married, upper class 
women "is very extensively practiced among married women 
without the slightest compunction, and as a consequence I 
believe that the number of children has materially fallen 
off."42 These testimonies of experience fueled the debate 
that upper-class women, both married and single, were 
seeking abortions at the expense of the birth rate. 
Religious distinctions among abortion seekers were also 
a point of contention for some nineteenth-century 
physicians. One doctor identified only as Dr. J.C. said, 
"in the matter of abortions, that the greater number of 
those which I have attended spring up in Protestants...; I 
have never treated a case in a Catholic or Hebrew which I 
41Ibid. , 16. 
42Ibid. , 17. 
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believed to be willful."43 Dr. David Gilbert testified that 
"It is a fact well known to practitioners, that communing 
members of the Catholic and Israelitish churches are not 
guilty of this crime."44 Dr. A.S. stated that Catholic 
women "are very much more free from the vice of criminal 
abortion than other women." Doctor J.M.C. was also 
concerned about the religious disparity. He noted that 
"Protestant women practice criminal abortion without any 
apparent misgivings of its gross impropriety, provided that 
the act is anterior to quickening...." His experience with 
Catholic women was the opposite. Protestant divine Reverend 
John Todd, D.D. of Boston noticed that "the practice of 
criminal abortion is far more common among Protestants than 
Catholics."45 Horatio Storer attributes the more frequent 
abortions among Protestants solely to widespread ignorance 
concerning the true nature of abortion among the community 
and society as a whole. He rejected conventional thought 
that Protestant churches were condoning abortion.46 
The physicians' movement was concerned with an 
increasing religious disparity in the emerging population. 
Physicians desiring to organize into a professional 
43Ibid. , 21. 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid. , 21-23. 
46Horatio Robinson Storer, M.D. , Why Not I A Book for Every 
Woman (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1868), 64. 
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association were typically sons from a wealthy family who 
studied in Edinburgh or with the more prominent American 
physicians. Those sons were not only from wealthy families, 
but most frequently from families of the Protestant faith as 
well. Based on the traditional composition of regular 
physicians, they were among the group that was procreating 
least quickly. The collective fear of being outbred was 
personal to the regular physicians of native and 
economically elevated stock. They were among those being 
outbred. 
Horatio R. Storer did not attempt to disguise his 
longings for continuing WASP superiority when he attributed 
abortion with the increasing "ill health of our women and in 
the gradual dying out of our native population...."47 
According to Storer, "It was proved... that in one state, 
one of the wealthiest in the Union, the natural increase in 
population, or the excess of births over deaths, has of late 
years been wholly by those of foreign origin."48 Storer's 
attention to the increase in the foreign population at the 
expense of the native born feeds off of collective WASP 
fear. This fear drove the organizing physicians' collective 
action and acted as a significant spark to legislators. The 
47Horatio Robinson Storer, M.D., Is It I?: A Book for 
Every Man (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1868), 95-96. 
48Horatio R. Storer, Why Not! : A Book For Every Woman 
(Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1868), 63. 
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power structure was composed of mainly WASP men, so that 
collective compulsion to act had a political and legislative 
outlet. Storer's colleague Andrew Nebinger shared the fear 
of increasing foreign populations. Nebinger determined 
"that wherever the births most exceed the deaths, there the 
foreign element most abounds; but where the population is 
made up mostly or entirely of the original native stock, the 
births and deaths approximate near together...."49 
Storer believed all members of the community to be 
responsible for the shortcomings and "evil deeds" of the 
community at large. Abortion, according to Storer, was a 
"crime not merely against the life of the child and the 
health of its mother, and against good morals, but it 
strikes a blow at the very foundation of society itself."50 
His believed that all members of the community should stand 
against abortion activity. By turning abortion into a crime 
against all white, native-born Americans, he advanced the 
transition of abortion into the public sphere, and it became 
a political and community issue. Eugenics and fear created 
a prime environment for abortion legislation to transform 
from protecting the mother to prohibitive legislation 
intended to protect native's position in the country. 
49Andrew Nebinger, Criminal Abortion: Its Extent and 
Prevention
 f read before the Philadelphia County Medical 
Society, February 9, 1870 (Philadelphia, 1870). 
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Storer believed that community attention should be focused 
on informing individual women of abortion evils and on 
reforming abortionists. 
Another example of Storer's rejection of individualism 
and embracement of community ideas is reflected in his 
memories of coverture — a common law doctrine involving the 
absorption of a woman's legal identity into her husband's 
upon marriage.51 Storer expressed regret that coverture was 
abandoned at law and noted that, "Formerly men had control, 
exclusive and entire, of any possessions of their wives." 
The implication seems to be that if men had control of all 
their wives' possessions then perhaps curtailing the 
frequency of abortions could be done with ease. Storer 
seems to hold women responsible for the abortion "crisis."52 
Women, according to Storer, preferred "to devastate 
with poison and with steel their wombs, rather than... 
forego the gaieties of a winter's balls, parties, and plays, 
or the pleasures of a summer's trip and amusements."53 
Storer despised abortion and the underlying priority shift 
accompanying its frequency among the wealthy women of 
America. He deplored the idea that America's wealthy women 
"For a discussion of coverture see Michael Grossberg, 
Governing the Hearth; Law and the Family in Nineteenth-
Century America (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985). 
"Storer, Is It I?, 94. 
"Storer and Heard, Criminal Abortion, 72. 
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were increasingly interested in exploring pursuits that 
conflicted with the traditional relational roles as doting 
mother and wife. Storer held that women belonged in the 
domestic sphere. By abandoning domesticity women were 
rearranging the structure of society — a detestable act, 
according to Storer. Storer urged that women not pursue 
nontraditional pleasures and instead dedicate themselves to 
procreation and the maintainence of community well-being. 
Storer's finger-pointing at women was significant 
because it reflected shifting attitudes concerning abortion 
and the slant of legislation. Formerly all restrictions 
were imposed to protect women — the abortionist was the 
culpable party at law. Storer rejects the traditional 
apportionment of guilt. In Storer's mind, even "if the 
mother does not herself induce the abortion, she seeks it, 
or aids it, or consents to it, and is, therefore, whether 
ever seeming justified or not, fully accountable as a 
principal."54 By shifting responsibility and guilt to 
women, in addition to physicians who agreed to perform 
abortions, prohibiting all abortions became significantly 
more logical. If women were held responsible for the 
declining native population, and for the unnatural act of 
abortion, then the solution to the problem was prohibiting 
their option to abort. Prohibiting abortions would be more 
54Ibid. , 97-98. 
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effective than simply placing restrictions on those 
providing abortion services. In addition, preventing 
women's option to abort would prevent women from 
overstepping the traditional role allotted to females. 
Storer did not believe that women were able to make a 
rational decision concerning pregnancy, particularly while 
pregnant. Storer maintains that a "woman's mind is prone to 
depression and, indeed, to temporary actual derangement, 
under the stimulus of uterine excitation." During pregnancy 
she is accordingly susceptible to whims that she would 
otherwise not be drawn to.55 Storer neglects to note that 
women would obviously not be prone to consider abortion 
while not pregnant. 
The attachment of abortion guilt to women themselves 
was also significant. The connection between rhetoric 
opposed to women seeking abortions and the alteration of the 
common law tradition had tremendous importance on the 
increasing regulation of the practice. A major step toward 
the prohibition of abortions was the prosecution of women in 
addition to the abortionist. Legislation targeting only the 
abortionist was originally framed as a protective measure. 
Targeting women in abortion legislation demonstared the 
transition from protective to prohibitive legislation. This 
shift was in direct conflict with the immunity provided to 
55Storer, Why Not!: A Book for Every Woman, 74-75. 
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women at common law and its early codification. The 
rhetoric of the physicians' campaign also challenged common 
law notions beyond women's immunity. Physicians attacked 
the validity of quickening doctrine itself, and they 
publicized their dissension beginning in the 1840s. 
Doctors reevaluated the quickening distinction. They 
began to see pregnancy as a process with no one moment any 
more important to the development of life than any other 
moment. As D. Humphrey Storer, Horatio's father and 
professor of obstetrics and medical jurisprudence at Harvard 
University, said, "The moment an embryo enters the uterus a 
microscopic speck, it is the germ of a human being." He 
continued to state that, "it is as morally wrong to endeavor 
to destroy that germ as to be guilty of the crime of 
infanticide.1,56 
The instant that the mother became aware of fetal 
movement was no longer thought by the physicians to be a 
moment with grand significance. Animation did not occur the 
instant fetal movement was noticeable, but rather the 
physicians declared animation and conception occurred 
simultaneously. The emergence of the new philosophy was a 
major turning point for abortion law in the United States. 
Quickening remained as a step in gestation, but it no longer 
held the significance of determining life or the presence of 
56D. Humphrey Storer, "Two Frequent Causes of Uterine 
Disease," Journal of Gynaecological Society of Boston 6 
(March, 1872): 199, originally written in November 1855. 
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a soul. Storer was clear in announcing that "children are 
fully alive from the moment of conception,...."57 Hugh 
Hodge refuted the quickening doctrine by declaring that, 
"the embryo is nevertheless endowed, at once, with the 
principles of vitality; and, although retained within the 
system of its mother, it has, in a strict sense, an 
independent existence."58 Dismantling quickening and 
establishing an independent existence of the fetus combined 
with the dissolution of women's common law immunity opened 
the gateway for strict anti-abortion laws. 
The acceptance of animation at conception introduced a 
new need in abortion legislation, the consideration of 
rights. At what point was the mother guilty of a serious 
crime? When did fetal life become equal to and greater in 
importance than the woman's traditional ability to access 
abortion services with ease? Another question to be 
addressed at law involved exceptions to the statutes. It is 
paradoxical that the physicians, who preached animation at 
conception and the absolute evil inherent in abortion, were 
the group allotted the power to make exceptions to their 
absolute beliefs. The therapeutic exception, increasingly 
common as legislation evolved, meant physicians could allow 
abortion, the very act that they rhetorically bashed. The 
contradiction in the physicians' position is explained by 
57Storer, Is it I?: A Book for Every Man, 95. 
S8Hodge, Foeticide. 15. 
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the power that regulars gained from the authority to grant 
abortions. That power significantly increased their status 
and helped to entrench regulars as the most qualified 
medical professionals. 
In addition to fear of growing population disparities 
and a shift in the way some prominent physicians viewed 
abortion, there were other societal factors at work. The 
most significant of which included the commercialization of 
abortifacients and the rise of mass urban newspaper 
circulation. Together they created an atmosphere for the 
introduction of a new wave of abortion laws. The visibility 
and increasingly public nature of abortion were significant 
elements in the evolving debate. Abortion practices were 
changing, in addition to its clientele and public profile. 
Before the 1840s women most commonly procured abortion 
in their home. That fact was not completely altered after 
1840, though commercialization and advertisements of 
abortion remedies publicized the practice to a large extent. 
By the 1844, the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 
reported the presence of six practitioners selling 
abortifacients in the local area.59 In-home abortifacients 
on the market consisted of pills, fluid extracts, and oils. 
The majority were pills and fluid extracts with one 
outstanding ingredient, typically an aloe or black 
59Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, XXXI, No. 6 (Sept. 
11, 1844), 124, cited in Mohr, Abortion in America, 53. 
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hellebore. The minor ingredients in the typical pill 
included a blend of powdered savin, iron, ergot, and solid 
tansy and rue extracts. Women were advised to take the 
pills and drink tansy tea twice daily until the obstruction 
was removed. Fluid extracts were oils of savin, tansy, or 
rue contained in alcohol with wintergreen added to make the 
potion ingestible and palatable. Some of the concoctions 
were effective, though a number of recommended remedies were 
not. 
The abortifacients were sold under commonly known terms 
including the "Female Regulator," "Periodical Drops," the 
Uterine Regulator," and "Woman's Friend." The phrases were 
merely suggestive though the product labels made the 
potential use apparent.60 Warnings typical to a subtly 
titled abortifacient advised the user that the concoction 
would surely cause a miscarriage if used by women in their 
early months of pregnancy. Boston based drug firm Goodwin 
and Company in 1847 sold seven brands of pills targeting 
women. The brands included "Hardy's Woman's Friend," 
"Belcher's Female Cure," "Lyons's Periodical Drops," and 
"The Samaritan's Gift for Females." In 1885 Chicago 
druggists Fuller and Fuller marketed "Dr. Caton's Tansy 
Regulator," Colchester's Pennyroyal and Tansy Pills," 
Colchester's Pennyroyal Pills," and Cook's Cotton Root 
60Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 225. 
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Compound." All of those were attributed with the 
restoration of menses and ability to trigger a miscarriage. 
The label on "Graves Pills for Amenorrhea" stated that, 
"These pills have been approved by the Ecole de Medicine, 
fully sanctioned by the M.R.C.S. of London, Edinburgh, 
Dublin, as a never failing remedy for producing the 
catamenial or monthly flow. Though perfectly harmless to 
the most delicate, yet ladies are earnestly requested not to 
mistake their condition as MISCARRIAGE WOULD CERTAINLY 
ENSUE."61 Even in 1900, after the legislative shift, the 
E.L. Patch Company in Boston offered emmenagogues through 
their catalogue. The pills were "Chocolate covered, 5 1/4 
gram tablets with one grain each cotton root, iron sulfate, 
aloes, ergotin, black hellebore, and 1/4 min. oil of 
savin. "62 
Abortive instruments were also commercially available 
with growing frequency after the 1840s. Devices designed to 
produce an abortion were sold through the mail, in retail 
drug stores, and by wholesale druggist' mail order 
catalogues. A wide variety of instruments were available. 
There were different styles and models of both uterine 
sounds and dilators. By the 1850s, catheters, speculums, 
and uterine sounds were given attention in medical 
""Criminal Abortion," Druggists Circular 2 (1858), 139. 
62Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 226. 
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journals.63 An article in the American Medical Times, 
titled "Instruments of a Notorious Abortionist," described 
forty different abortion instruments. The majority of the 
devices were simplistic, including spoons with bent handles, 
wires attached to pen holders, and placenta forceps.64 
In 1875 physician W.M. Smith from Atkinson, Illinois, 
discussed the success and danger of instrumental abortions 
in a letter to the editor published in Medical and Surgical 
Reporter. Smith said, "After the failure of tansy, savin, 
ergot, cotton root, lifting, rough trotting horses, etc., a 
knitting needle is the stand by. One old doctor near here 
was so obliging as to furnish a wire with a handle, to one 
of his patients, which did the work for her, after which she 
passed it to one of her neighbors, who succeeded in 
destroying the foetus and nearly so herself."65 Given the 
great potential for failure of pills, fluid extracts, and 
oils, the instrument provided another course of action. 
Women turned to surgical methods after exhausting herbal 
possibilities.66 
When women turned to abortion services outside their 
home and attempted non-herbal abortion methods, they sought 
"Ibid., 225-227. 
64
 "Instruments of a Notorious Abortionist," American 
Medical Times 6 (1863), 34. 
65W.M. Smith, Letter to the editor, "The Prevalence of 
Abortion," Medical and Surgical Reporter 33 (1875): 259. 
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the aid of a midwife or went to a lying-in boardinghouse. 
Midwives identified the nature of their business to the 
public with a flag dangling from a window. By the mid 
1800s, the majority of abortionists were referred to as 
"female physicians." Both New England and the Midwest had 
lying in abortion services within their borders. The 
establishments were privately owned boardinghouses, clinics, 
and offices. Legal historian Janet Farrell Brodie admits 
uncertainty about the number of such facilities, though they 
were typically managed by midwives trained in Europe.67 
One such facility was New York City's Lying-in 
Institute located at 6 Amity Place. The operation was 
managed by Julia and H.D. Grindle. Their circulars from the 
1860s mention the abortion methods available, including 
powders and the vaginal syringe. The actual advertisement 
guarantees "certain relief to ladies at one interview with 
or without medication.1168 The Grindles also offered a 
bottle of pills, sold for two dollars, "which when taking 
according to directions will remove all obstructions of the 
womb and bring on the menstrual periods, from whatever cause 
produced." The Grindle's explanation went on to state 
"Caution: If this medicine is taken during the early months 
67Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 227-230. 
68John Paull Harper, "Be Fruitful and Multiply: The 
Reaction to Family Limitation in Nineteenth-Century America" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975), 
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of pregnancy it will be sure to produce a miscarriage. 
However, if any should make a mistake and a miscarriage be 
the result, it will not in the least injure their health."69 
The Grindle's operation was fairly lucrative, though the 
couple encountered multiple law suits as a result of their 
success. 
In 1868, Mr. Grindle was indicted on abortion-'charges. 
A woman died following a suspected abortion while 
recuperating at the Grindle's facility. Grindle was 
acquitted since there was no proof that the abortion caused 
her death. She simply died while staying at their boarding 
house. Both Mr. and Mrs. Grindle were indicted four years 
later. They sold a woman a twenty-dollar bottle of 
abortifacients. The judge declared that the Grindles were 
not guilty as the woman did not tell them that she was 
indeed pregnant. Th»a intended use was thus in question, and 
the couple was not culpable-at law for selling 
abortifacients to a woman with child.70 The Grindle's 
interaction with the law, however, was minor compared to 
what other abortionists faced. The story of Ann Lohman 
illustrates the room for success and ruin when operating a 
large scale abortion service. 
Ann Lohman's abortion service from 1839 to 1877 proved 
tremendously lucrative. Lohman became the most infamous 
69Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 228-229. 
70Harper, "Reaction to Family Limitation," 124-125. 
50 
abortionist in New York. Her fame warranted a cover name; 
she was known as "Madame Restell." Like many of America's 
abortionists she had European roots. She was born in 
Painswick, England, and later returned to England 
immediately before delving into the abortion services. 
Restell's operation was large scale and was aggressively 
advertised. Restell's first advertisement was printed in 
the New York Sun on March 18, 1839. The advertisement 
announced the arrival of Restell in the world of family 
limitation. She attempts to intrigue all readers who are 
interested in the advantages of family limitation. The 
advertisement reads 
TO MARRIED WOMEN.— It is not but too well known 
that the families of the married often increase 
beyond the happiness of those who give them birth 
would dictate? In how many instance does the 
hard-working father, and more especially the 
mother, of a poor family remain slaves throughout 
their lives, "urging at the oar of incessant 
labor, toiling to live, living but to toil," when 
they might have enjoyed comfort and comparative 
affluence; and if care and toil have weighed down 
the spirit, and at last broken the health of the 
father, how often is the widow left, unable, with 
the most virtuous intentions, to save her 
fatherless offspring from becoming degraded 
objects of charity or profligate votaries of vice? 
Is it desirable, then, is it moral for parents to 
increase their families, regardless of 
consequences to themselves, or the well being of 
their offspring, when a simple, easy, healthy, and 
certain remedy is within our control? 
The advertiser, feeling the importance of this 
subject, and estimating the vast benefit resulting 
to the thousands by the adoptions of means 
prescribed by her, (introduced by the celebrated 
midwife and female physician, Mrs. Restell, the 
grandmother of the advertiser,) and who has made 
51 
this subject her particular and especial study, 
has opened an office, where married females can 
obtain the desired information.71 
In addition to newspaper advertising campaigns, Restell 
utilized circulars. Circulars proved an effective method of 
spreading information about her abortion office and the mail 
order business. Restell offered women a solution to 
unwanted pregnancy. Besides the pills she sold, a simple 
operation was available at her office. Restell's pricing 
methods were based on a sliding scale. The average wealthy 
woman was charged $100 for the procedure while her poorer 
sisters may only be charged $20 . 72 Restell scholar Clifford 
Browder determined that "her circulars were in demand, her 
reception room was never empty, and when she opened her 
office in the morning, she might find a half dozen customers 
at the door."73 
Restell's life illustrates the potential to earn a 
fortune in abortion services and displays the alteration in 
the law's tolerance for abortionists. Prior to her arrest 
in 1878, her services were in such high demand that she 
opened branches in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.74 
71Sun, March 27, 1839. The advertisement began on March 
18; reprinted in its entirety in Clifford Browder, The 
Wickedest Woman in New York: Madame Restell, The Abortionist 
(Hamen, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1988); emphasis added. 
72Clifford Browder, The Wickedest Woman, 16. 
73Ibid. , 17. 
74Allan Keller, Scandalous Lady (New York: Antheneum, 
1981), 5-7; Brodie, Abortion and Contraception, 229. 
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Her career is testimony that women were seeking abortions in 
fairly large numbers, and that married women were the target 
of advertisements. It is significant that even her first 
advertisement in 1839 singled out married women as the ones 
to benefit from her services. Newspapers advertisements 
like Restell's increased the visibility of abortion, and 
drew attention to the fact that abortion was not simply for 
the single woman hoping to avoid shame. Abortion was 
available and sought out by married women, it was not only a 
recourse for the desperate, but it was also a method of 
family limitation. 
The advent of urban newspaper mass circulation was a 
major factor in the commercialization of abortion and the 
anti-abortion campaign in the early 1840s. The increase in 
circulation was a result of an increasing urban population, 
printing industrialization, and the increased attention to 
commercial advertising. The circulation of the penny press 
furthered the commercialization of the abortion industry, 
and raised urban consciousness about abortion options. 
Thus, abortion was removed from the private world of woman 
seeking advice from other women — placing it solidly into 
the lap of the male-dominated commercial and public world. 
Newspaper coverage of abortion ironically undermined 
the very people paying to advertise in the papers. 
Advertisements for abortionists and abortifacients were a 
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regular source of income for the newspapers. During a 
single week in 1845, The Boston Daily Times ran 
advertisements for "Dr. Melveau's Portuguese Female Pills," 
"Madame Restell's Female Pills," "Madame Drunette's Lunar 
Pills," "Dr. Monroe's French Periodical Pills," and "Dr. 
Peter's French Renovating Pills."75 Given the amount of 
paid advertisements the newspaper received in one week 
alone, it is ironic that the newspaper industry 
simultaneously began to undermine its financial 
contributors. 
Competition between the urban newspapers sparked a wave 
of sensationalism. The ultimate goal was to grab reader 
attention, even if to do so meant diverging from truth and 
objectivity. Abortion was an issue which the newspapers 
were able to sensationalize with success. Particularly as 
anti-abortion rhetoric increased, the emotionally charged 
issue was a gold mine for the penny press.76 The same 
industry that helped to catapult abortion services into the 
commercial world simultaneously furthered the efforts of 
anti-abortion crusaders. 
The New York Police Gazette turned the abortion issue 
into a series of stories meant to incite fear. The 
sensational stories claimed that women were systematically 
75Mohr, Abortion in America, 53. 
76Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct, 225-226. 
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disappearing. The Gazette published stories claiming that 
abortionists actually sold the aborted baby bodies to 
medical schools. The fetuses would then be used in medical 
experimentation. A cover picture on the March 13, 1847 
issue of the Gazette shows a woman of fashion with devils 
wing's in place of her arms. The attractive woman is 
pictured with a fang-toothed devil head peering from her 
pelvis while munching on a plump infant.77 The woman is 
clearly depicted as unnatural and deviant, as dangerous and 
destructive.78 The devil imagery symbolized the rejection 
of God's natural order and the absence of goodness in the 
action. The New York Police Gazette offered dramatic 
examples of the sensationalization of abortion. 
Mainstream newspapers also sensationalized the coverage 
of abortion stories, including the New York Times. The 
Times coverage became even more forceful when George Jones 
assumed the position of manager and Louis John Jennings 
began as editor-in-chief. Coverage of abortion focused on 
deadly abortions. Daily articles and editorials were firmly 
against unrestricted abortion and called for prohibitive 
legislation. The Times tied two of the most prominent anti-
abortion arguments — the protection of women and the 
definition of abortion as murder. On August 23, 1871, 
77Cover, National Police Gazette II (March 13, 1847); 
Mohr, Abortion in America. 127. 
78Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct, 227. 
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reporter Augustus St. Clair wrote that abortion facilities 
were filled with thousands of people who "are murdered 
before they have seen the light of this world, and thousands 
upon thousands more of adults are irremediably ruined in 
constitution, health, and happiness."79 The Times also 
furthered the physicians' quest by identifying abortionists 
without a medical diploma as quacks. The Times was not 
alone in attacking abortion in the editorial pages and with 
sensationalization tactics. 
Increased commercialization raised public awareness to 
and sensitivity to the abortion issue. The physicians' use 
of fear and eugenics had an appeal to those typically in 
positions of power, lawmakers able to influence abortion 
patterns. The environment for additional abortion 
legislation was primed by the physicians' public 
reconsideration of quickening and the role of women in 
abortion. Their rhetoric seeped into state legislatures, 
and at times their influence upon the wording of laws was 
virtually direct. The increased public awareness of 
abortion due to commercialization drew attention and forced 
reaction to an act that was formerly private and used common 
botanicals from the garden. Businesses like Restell's 
increased publicity; such exposure altered the nature of 
abortive methods. Patented concoctions and office visits 
85Mohr, Abortion in America, 123-124, 291 at n.14. 
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joined the herbal preparations and physical routines 
followed in the privacy of one's home as alternatives to 
pregnancy. 
The alteration in the nature of abortive services 
affected the societal status of abortion. It entered the 
public realm in two senses. People were relying on outside 
business people to enable the termination of their 
pregnancy. In addition, the new patented abortifacients 
opened the door to the world of commercial advertising. 
These two developments were mutually reinforcing. By 
opening abortion to the public realm in advertisements, the 
issue was then appropriate for the press. The same business 
that benefitted financially from abortion related 
advertisements presented a sensational glimpse of the 
abortion industry- Physicians actively wrote letters to 
editors in order to capitalize on the emerging public forum. 
Once abortion services entered the public realm and were 
advertised and addressed in the news papers, the public 
monitoring of that activity followed. As abortion became a 
public, visible, and commercial phenomenon, legislatures' 
involvement in the issue was increasingly justified. 
Legislative Reactions to a Shifting Society 
Accompanying the changes in the nature of the abortion 
industry and the country's awareness of abortion were twenty 
years of transitional abortion legislation. Between 1840 
and 1860 society, physicians, and lawmakers began to react 
to the changes in the business of abortion. The period's 
legislation was not yet fully restrictive, but aspects of 
the common law tradition were being altered by the passage 
of statutes. 
Massachusetts was the first state to pass a bill that 
addressed abortion as its sole issue; formerly, it had 
simply been attached to other criminal codes. In 1845 the 
governor of Massachusetts signed into law an anti-abortion 
bill that made attempted abortion a misdemeanor, and a 
felony if the woman died. Punishment was a one-to-seven year 
jail sentence. In an eight- year period spanning from 1849 
to 1857, thirty-two abortion cases came before the court. 
None of those cases led to conviction of the abortionist.80 
Though the law was on the books, the failure to successfully 
prosecute thirty-two cases seems to prove that there was a 
loophole rendering it unenforceable. The statute did not 
139Mohr, Abortion in America, 73. 
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adjust the common law definition of pregnancy; to be 
pregnant one must be quick with child. Proving that the 
woman who sought an abortionist's services was pregnant 
proved virtually impossible for the prosecution. If not 
proven to be quick the woman could have been seeking the 
treatment for another condition. 
The Massachusetts government passed the anti-abortion 
statute in response to two trials of abortionists that ended 
in acquittal. Both cases were topics in the popular press 
and came before Massachusetts courts. Commonwealth v. 
Luceba Parker began in 1843 when Parker was indicted. She 
was accused of providing instrumental abortions for three 
different married women. The case reached the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court in 1845. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw heard the 
case and found Parker not guilty. His ruling was based on 
the Bangs decision which upheld the common law doctrine of 
quickening. Shaw adhered to the precedent that providing an 
abortion prior to quickening was not a crime. It was not 
proven that quickening had occurred.81 
The other major abortionist trial prior to the passing 
of the anti-abortion law ended in a similar fashion. Dr. 
Alexander S. Butler was prosecuted because he provided an 
operative procedure and the abortifacient ergot. Also 
indicted was Fenner Ballou who was the woman's lover and the 
81Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Mete.) 263, 43 Am. 
Dec. 396 (1840). 
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party to finance the procedure. A jury of their peers found 
both men innocent. The basis of the decision was the common 
law. The pregnancy was not, or could not be, proven to be 
quickened. As a result of the publicized trials, the 
Massachusetts legislature responded with the anti-abortion 
bill in an attempt to aid prosecution of such cases. The 
intended result was not actualized.82 The law in 
Massachusetts was a move toward restrictive legislation, but 
it was not a significant divergence from the common law. 
The issue of fetal development still prevented enforcement 
of the law. The quickening was firmly intact in the 
courtroom, the statute did not break with the quickening 
doctrine. 
A major break with the common law tradition came with 
the 1845 New York abortion law. The first portion of the 
law simply tightened existing sentences. The woman's or 
fetus' death was deemed second-degree manslaughter after 
quickening. According to the new law, any one to 
"administer to any pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such 
woman, or advise or procure any such woman... with intent to 
procure miscarriage" faced a jail sentence of three to 
twelve months. Again, the New York law held to language 
85Mohr, Abortion in America, 123-124, 291 at n.14. 
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that rendered it essentially unenforceable — determining 
pregnancy hinged on quickening.83 
The truly new portion of the law dealt with the 
culpability of the woman herself. Until the passage of the 
1845 New York law, the common law tradition exempting the 
woman from guilt was honored throughout the United States. 
She was guilty if she performed the abortion alone, sought 
the services of an abortionist, and for allowing the 
abortion to be carried through. The woman faced three to 
twelve months in jail and or a $1,000 fine. The woman's 
jail sentence equaled that of the potential sentence of an 
abortionist. For the first time at law, the woman was as 
responsible as the person performing the procedure. The 
break with the exemption of women introduced an entirely new 
concept in abortion law. The step was significant, though 
it was not once enforced during the nineteenth century. As 
a result it was a revolution in the theory of abortion law, 
not in its enforcement. 
The motivating factors behind the 1845 bill, including 
the efforts of Dr. Gunning Bedford, proved as interesting as 
its results. Bedford was attempting to specialize in his 
medical practice, choosing to pursue obstetrics and 
gynecology. Throughout the 1840s Bedford denounced Madame 
"cited in Cyril C. Means, "The Law of New York Concerning 
Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of 
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Restell — the two were competitors. Other physicians 
rallied in support of Bedford's efforts. The physicians led 
a campaign that denounced the new commercialization trend in 
abortion services. Such commercialization was coined 
"Restellism" by Bedford and supporting regulars. The 
regulars began to see that abortion could not be ended 
simply by punishing the party providing the service. 
According to one New York physician in 1846, "Restell is to 
be looked upon as an effect, rather than a cause... The 
legislature must go to the root of the evil, of which this 
abomination [Restellism] is the fruit. That root, I am 
satisfied, is popular ignorance and prejudice, founded on 
that ignorance.1184 
As physicians began to recognize that the nature and 
target of abortion law needed change, the legislature of New 
York apparently did as well — as evidenced by the break 
with common law. The fact that abortion was seemingly 
serious enough to require the fundamentals of common law be 
changed suggests that abortion was frequent and that it was 
not as heinously dangerous as regulars and press 
sensationalists were indicating. The regulars were 
politically involved and Bedford even had an influential 
relationship with the mayor of New York.85 In addition to 
84A Physician of New-York, Trial of Madame Restell, I, 19; 
Mohr, Abortion in America, 128. 
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the physicians' influence, the popular press also played a 
role. 
The National Police Gazette sensationalized abortion 
stories during the mid-1840s. The editors strongly called 
for increased regulation of abortion. According to Mohr, 
the declining birth rate also influenced New York 
legislators. Women were bearing fewer children and 
legislators viewed this as negative, according to a 
statement made by a New York physician. The active, anti-
Restellism regular noted that, "checks on population... At 
present, and in this country, population is wealth and a 
blessing, and the public is not disposed to look with favor 
upon any means for keeping it down."86 Fear of a population 
drop in combination with timely sensationalization in the 
public press, as well as physicians' desire to remove 
competition from abortionists, all influenced the 
introduction and passage of New York's 1845 law. 
Just as New York determined that another legal method 
was necessary to curb abortion activity, Massachusetts also 
explored alternative laws. New York's method, on paper, was 
to hold the women responsible and attempt to halt the 
abortion business. In Massachusetts the method was to 
hinder abortion related advertising. The idea was to 
eliminate access to knowledge about where to find 
abortionists and abortifacients making it inaccessible. The 
86Ibid. 
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1847 prohibition of advertisements was born of concerns 
about the declining number of births since abortion and 
contraception were linked by the law. According to the law 
Whoever knowingly advertises, prints, publishes, 
distributes or circulates, or knowingly causes to 
be advertised, printed, published, distributed or 
circulated, any pamphlet, printed paper, book, 
newspaper notice, advertisement or reference, 
containing words or language giving or conveying 
any notice, hint or reference to any person, or to 
the name of any person, real or fictitious; from 
whom, or to any place, house, shop or office 
where, any poison, drug, mixture, preparation, 
medicine, or noxious thing, or any instrument or 
means whatever, or any advice, direction, 
information or knowledge, may be obtained for the 
purpose of causing or procuring the miscarriage of 
a woman pregnant with child or [of] preventing, or 
which is represented as intended to prevent, 
pregnancy, shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for not more than three years 
or in jail for not more than two and one half 
years or by a fine of not more than one thousand 
dollars.87 
The bill treats abortion more as a method of family 
limitation and less as a moral issue of life and death. 
Prior to quickening, abortion was equated more closely with 
contraception. The measure resulted in frustration for 
anti-abortion crusaders concerning the unenforceable nature 
of the abortion laws thus far. Advertisement could be 
regulated while monitoring abortion was proving 
unsuccessful. 
87|lSearch in Journals," Papers of the Birth Control 
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The inclusion of the word "knowingly" softened the law 
which was intended to be a forceful measure against 
advertising. "Knowingly" introduced a loophole for the 
publishers and distributors of newspapers. This left room 
for the continuation of advertising so long as it was subtle 
and veiled. If the intention of the advertisement was not 
clear, the newspapers could feign ignorance. 
In 1846 Vermont introduced its first legislation 
addressing abortion. The law criminalized the attempted 
abortion of quickened children. If the woman died from the 
abortion attempt, it constituted a felony. Michigan passed 
its first legislation in 1846 as well. Michigan's law 
resembled that of New York. The state legislature deemed 
abortion at any time a crime punishable with a maximum $500 
fine or a year in jail. Abortion after quickening was 
considered manslaughter. Michigan also included a 
therapeutic exception clause requiring the opinion of two 
physicians.88 That law granted them a special power; in 
Virginia, one doctor in particular was able to wield his 
power and influence the penning of a law. 
Two years later Virginia passed a criminal code that 
included a section concerning abortion. According to 
historian James Mohr, the portion was essentially written by 
88Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of 
Vermont. 1846 (Windsor, 1846); Journal of the Senate of the 
State of Michigan, 1846 (Detroit, 1846) as cited in Quay, 
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Richmond physician Levin S. Joynes, demonstrating the 
influence of the medical profession on Virginia's abortion 
law.89 The statute was different because it dealt with the • 
death of a fetus, rather than attempted abortion or the 
death of the woman. The punishment varied based on the 
level of fetal development. Terminating the development of 
a fetus before quickening was punishable with a jail 
sentence of one to twelve months. The death of a quickened 
fetus was punishable with one to five years in jail.90 The 
law was framed in such a manner that avoiding prosecution 
was simple. The language of the law required possession of 
the dead fetus in order to successfully prosecute an alleged 
abortionist. The fetus was the only evidence indicating the 
stage of gestation and verifying that growth had been 
halted. 
In 1849 California confronted the abortion issue. The 
revision of the California code included a section regarding 
abortion. The result was the criminalization of abortion 
only after the woman was clearly pregnant — after 
quickening.91 The same year, Wisconsin defined its legal 
89Mohr's assertion is based on Levin S. Joynes to Horatio 
R. Storer, May 4, 1859, Horatio R. Storer Papers, Countway 
Library, Harvard Medical School. 
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terms concerning abortion in a larger criminal code. The 
Wisconsin law rendered performing an abortion a crime after 
quickening.92 Wisconsin and California both held to the 
common law notion that abortion prior to animation was 
legal. 
New Hampshire also enacted legislation in 1849. The 
law meant New Hampshire was the second state to diverge from 
the tradition exempting women themselves from prosecution. 
Abortion was punishable with a maximum one year in jail or a 
$1000 fine. After quickening the punishment was raised to 
the monetary fine plus "confinement to hard labor not less 
than one year, nor more than ten years."93 If the abortion 
resulted in the woman's death, the abortionist could be 
charged with second-degree manslaughter. 
A significant section of the New Hampshire bill failed 
to pass in both the House and Senate. That portion would 
have made "any person who shall be knowing to the violation 
of the provisions of this act, and shall neglect to expose 
the same" subject to a maximum of one year in jail or $1000 
92The Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin
 r Passed 
at the Second Session of the Legislature, 1849 (Southport, 
1849), 683-684, a discussion of Wisconsin's law is provided in 
Mohr, Abortion in America, 133. 
93Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of 
New Hampshire, November Session, 1848 (Concord, 1849) , 69, 84, 
95, quoted in Mohr, Abortion in America, 13 3. 
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in fines.94 That provision would have changed the nature of 
abortion legislation. No longer would it be an issue 
between a woman and her abortionist; any member of the 
community aware of such activity could be prosecuted for 
failing to expose the woman and the abortionist. If that 
provision had been accepted, abortion would have become a 
community issue — everyone responsible for the activity of 
individuals. Population rhetoric already raised the 
abortion issue to the community level. Abortion, in various 
speeches, was called a crime against the community since 
there was a growing disparity in population. The failure of 
the legislature to pass that measure signified that law 
makers were not yet ready to institute a law that pitted 
neighbor against neighbor. 
An 1849 New Jersey Supreme Court case propelled the 
passage of an abortion bill that same year. Chief Justice 
Henry W. Green upheld the common law tradition. In the 
State v. Eliakim Cooper Green held that abortion attempted 
prior to quickening was not illegal so long as the woman 
consented to the procedure. Green included self-abortions 
in that ruling. Green refused to break with common law 
tradition and noted that the legislature must act to change 
94Journal of the Honorable Senate of the State of New 
Hampshire, November Session, 1848 (Concord, 1849), 30, 33-34, 
36-37, quoted in Mohr, Abortion in America
 r 133. 
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the tradition before the courts could diverge from the 
precedent.95 
New Jersey responded with a bill that maintained 
immunity of the woman herself but criminalized abortion 
attempts. The legislature also banned providing advice on 
abortion methods. If such advice resulted in the death of 
the woman, the offense became significantly more severe. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court heard a case challenging the 
1849 law. In 1858 Chief Justice Green heard the case of 
State v. Leonard Murphy. Murphy, accused of providing 
directions for the use of abortifacients, was found guilty 
in the lower court decision, and again by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. The decision of the court examined the 
nature of the law when it was passed. The court determined 
that the law was a safety-based law meant to protect women 
from men like Murphy- Green declared that the law was 
passed to modify the common law tradition as called for in 
his 1849 State v. Eliakim Cooper decision. According to 
Green's opinion, "The design of the statute was not to 
prevent the procuring of abortions, so much as to guard the 
health and life of the mother against the consequences of 
such attempts."96 The law addressed dangers women faced 
from incompetent abortionists, not abortions performed 
9SState v. Cooper, 22 N.J. Law (2 Zab.) 52, 51 Am. Dec. 
248 . 
96Ibid. 
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safely during the early stages of gestation when the 
procedure was least dangerous. 
The territories of Minnesota and Oregon passed their 
first abortion statutes along with their criminal codes in 
1851 and 1854, respectively. Both statutes maintained the 
quickening distinction. Unless the procedure injured the 
woman, abortion prior to quickening was legal. In 1854, 
Washington Territory passed a law which maintained women's 
immunity but criminalized all abortion attempts. 
Washington's statute used the clearest language by making it 
criminal to attempt abortion on a pregnant woman or a woman 
supposed to be pregnant. The Territory of Kansas passed a 
criminal code revision in 1855 that included an abortion 
section. It made abortion a misdemeanor regardless of 
quickening, though intent and pregnancy had to be proven. 
The intent clause rendered the law essentially 
unenforceable.97 
In 1854, Texas assigned an unusually stiff prison 
sentence of up to ten years for post-quickening abortions. 
In 1856 Texas reformed the statute, and the applicable 
sentence was decreased to between two and five years. In 
instances of abortion when the woman did not consent, the 
sentence was between four and ten years. In 1856 the 
97Mohr, Abortion in America, 138-139; Quay, 11 Justifiable 
Abortion," 474, 486-487, 505, 517; Code of Washington 
(Olympia, 1881), 164. 
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legislature also added to the statute that if the woman died 
due to the abortion then the abortionists would be tried on 
murder charges. Those supplying abortifacients were 
considered accomplices to murder if the woman died. Texas 
did leave room for a therapeutic exception if the woman's 
life was in danger if the pregnancy continued.98 In 1856 
Louisiana passed a law attaching similarly severe jail 
sentences to post-quickening abortions. The Louisiana 
legislature deemed an abortionist should be punished with 
one to ten years of hard labor in prison.99 
Dr. William Henry Brisbane was the driving force behind 
the passage of Wisconsin's abortion statute in 1858. 
Brisbane informed fellow crusader Dr. Horatio Storer that 
It is my present intention to endeavor to get a 
law passed by our legislature to meet the case, 
much too common, of administering drugs and 
injections either to prevent conception or destroy 
the embryo. It is an undoubted fact that, 
especially in high life, and in the middle ranks 
of society, many wives (and often with the 
connivance of their husbands) take measures 
of this kind. 
Brisbane recognized that the law would most likely prove 
unenforceable but thought "the existence of a law making it 
criminal, would probably have a moral influence to prevent 
it to some extent."100 On May 19, 1859, Brisbane mailed Dr. 
98Mohr, Abortion in America, 13 9; see also H.P.N. Gammel, 
comp., The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897 (Austin, 1898), 58, 1044. 
"The Louisiana law is quoted in Quay, "Justifiable 
Abortion," 477. 
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Storer a note, attached to the law, saying "I succeeded in 
having enacted by our legislature the following statute."101 
With Brisbane's influence, Wisconsin became the third 
state to remove women's immunity. The law stated that 
"every woman who shall take any medicine, drug, substance, 
or thing whatever, or who shall use or employ any 
instrument, or shall submit to any operation or other means 
whatever, with intent to procure a miscarriage" to be in 
violation of the law. Such women faced one to three months 
in jail or a fine up to $300.102 The abortionist still faced 
a greater conviction for second-degree manslaughter, but the 
woman's guilt is significant nonetheless. It was a break 
with common law; with the removal of women's immunity 
abortion law was more prohibitive and no longer protective 
in nature. 
It is significant that Brisbane referred to the 
husband's connivance in the abortion act and also pushed a 
law that removed women's immunity. If husbands were giving 
their tacit encouragement to wives seeking an abortion, 
perhaps both the husband and the woman would seriously 
consider the ramifications of doing so. It is likely that 
100William Henry Brisbane to Horatio R. Storer, April 6, 
1857, Storer Papers, cited in Mohr, Abortion in America. 140. 
101William Henry Brisbane to Horatio R. Storer, May 19, 
1859, Storer Papers, cited in Mohr, Abortion in America. 140. 
102Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin, 1858 
(Chicago, 1858), 969. 
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just as the women may have hesitated to abort based on a 
fear of legal punishment, so too the husbands might hold 
back their encouragement if their wives imprisonment was a 
distinct possibility. Brisbane's power to affect the law 
and the removal of women's immunity corresponded with the 
trend of the regular physician's increasing legal leverage. 
The removal of immunity was consistent with the regulars' 
belief that conception began fetal life. That belief 
reinforced the idea that women are as criminal as the 
abortionists. The law in Wisconsin represents a departure 
from abortion law as protective legislation. Wisconsin's 
action exemplifies the broad trend away from laws concerned 
with the protection of women to laws targeting women. 
Indiana revised its 1835 abortion statute in 1859 
because it was typical of unenforceable abortion 
legislation. The revision was motivated by a distaste for 
the number of abortion advertisements circulating around the 
state. Advertisements excerpted from the newspaper were 
highlighted during the debating of the bill. The bill made 
a criminal of any person selling a medicine capable of 
procuring abortion or miscarriage. The legislature added an 
intent clause that provided a loophole for abortionists. 
The clause only made selling abortifacients illegal if sold 
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with the intent of inducing abortion.103 Intent provided a 
slippery escape; abortifacients had dual purposes. 
Iowa was without an abortion law when it became a 
state. The sections of the territorial code that dealt with 
abortion were omitted upon statehood. A slander court 
raised the abortion issue. Abrams v. Foshee and Wife 
involved Mrs. Foshee making public statements that Mrs. 
Abrams had aborted multiple fetuses. Abrams sued Forshee on 
slander charges and prevailed. Iowa's Supreme Court heard 
the appeal and reversed the decision. The judgment was 
based on the fact that abortion was not illegal. Since 
abortion was legal, it was not slander to accuse someone of 
abortion. The judge determined that having the public know 
of one's abortion habits would not ruin her standing in the 
community. The ruling stated that such accusations would 
not "exclude [a woman] from society and render her infamous 
in the common sense of that term."104 Abortion was not equal 
to questioning someone's chastity, which would be slanderous 
at law. Accusations of abortion were compared to 
accusations of being a tattler, liar, person who swears, or 
a drinker. 
103The Indiana law is quoted in Quay, "Justifiable 
Abortion," 468. 
104Abrams v_s. Foshee 3 Iowa (3 Clarke) 274, 66 A. Dec. 77 
(1856). 
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The state supreme court decision sparked a new abortion 
statute. Dr. D.L. McGugin contacted an Iowa senator and 
called for a law in response to the Foshee decision. 
McGugin's senator introduced an abortion bill in 1858, but 
it was relatively lax. Using an instrument on or providing 
medicine to a pregnant woman with the intent of procuring an 
abortion was punishable by up to $1000 or one year in 
jail.105 The wording of the bill referred to attempts after 
quickening, and the intent clause made the law basically 
unenforceable. 
The law was an issue in another slander suit, Hatfield 
v. Gano. A woman was accused of self-abortion and sued on 
slander charges. The Iowa Supreme Court in 1863 stated, "It 
is clear to us from the wording of [the 1858 law], that it 
is the person who used the means with the pregnant woman to 
procure the abortion, and not the woman herself, that the 
legislature intended to punish."106 Since the woman herself 
was not liable, it was not slanderous to accuse someone of 
self-induced abortion. Iowa's slander suits and the nature 
of the laws revised and introduced between 1840 and 1860 
illustrate that abortion itself was not considered a heinous 
crime. The laws, with the exception of the three states 
mentioned, targeted the abortionist. They remained mostly 
protective pieces of legislation, or they attempted to 
105Mohr, Abortion in America. 144. 
1Q6Hatfield v^ Gano. 15 Iowa 177 (1863). 
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target the increased and blatant advertising of 
abortifacients and abortion services. 
The influence of individual physicians was also 
becoming apparent during that time period. The collective 
involvement of the physicians became even more apparent; the 
American Medical Association, AMA, was founded in 1847. The 
organization was able to channel the power that had been 
dispersed among individual physicians. The collective power 
of the AMA was greater than that of individual physicians 
pursuing the same goal. The AMA had an agenda that included 
elevating the status of its member physicians and the anti-
abortion campaign would become a crucial part of that 
effort. 
Physicians Unite 
The American Medical Association was founded in 1847 to 
strengthen the position of American physicians. The 
prominent physicians that organized and professionalized 
sought to remove competition from the abundance of people 
practicing medicine. There were institutions passing out 
medical degrees without an emphasis on research and 
scientific method. There were also homeopaths and midwives 
practicing medicine as they always had. One means of 
promoting dominance by regular physicians was to push for 
licensing laws and self-regulation of the profession. The 
status of physicians, however, was not high enough that 
licensing alone would propel the institution. The 
physicians used the abortion issue as a rallying point for 
physicians to unite and be heard. Abortion was an issue 
that had convenient consequences, making it the ideal 
unifier for physicians.107 They emerged from the nineteenth 
century as the only group powerful enough to allow an 
abortion. The irony of that role is thick, particularly 
given the prohibition of abortions in the Hippocratic Oath 
107The majority of literature detailing abortion in the 
nineteenth century includes some histort of the AMA. The most 
thorough of the sources is Mohr, Abortion in America. 
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and the abundance of rhetoric that abortion was an absolute 
wrong. 
Since knowledge of pregnancy had advanced, and 
physicians accepted that life began at conception, they were 
able to make decisions of life and death. No other party 
was able to make that decision, not even the pregnant woman. 
That ability in essence raised the physician to a position 
of power equal to that of clergy and judge. The three were 
moral arbitrators and powerful enough to make decisions 
immediately influencing individuals. 
Physicians adopted moral arguments as the dominant 
criteria for prohibiting abortion. Arguments of morality 
and natural law bolstered the rhetoric concerning eugenics 
and alteration of women's traditional functions. The 1871 
AMA report relied on arguments from St. Paul and the Bible. 
Abortion was condemned as it diverged from the laws of 
nature and God. The physicians preached God's law, not 
strictly medicine.108 Dr. O.E. Herrick referred to this 
phenomena as "half preacher and half doctor." Herrick 
continued to comment on the abundance of physicians tangled 
in preaching.109 
108Carl N. Degler, A£ Odds: Women and the Family in 
America from the Revolution to the Present (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 240-242. 
1O90.E. Herrick, M.D., "Specialties," Michigan Medical 
News, 4 (1881): 41. 
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Literature reflecting the moral arguments of the AMA 
was a major component of their agenda. The abortion issue 
was a sounding board for the newly organized physicians to 
rally around, and this rhetoric was ideal for catapulting 
the physician into the role of moral arbitrator. The 
physicians had direct and indirect influence over state 
legislatures and public opinion. Physicians lobbied their 
state legislatures, wrote letters to the editor, highlighted 
abortion at their annual meetings, held essay contests for 
anti-abortion material, and left evidence of loaded rhetoric 
in books concerning obstetrics and women's health issues. 
In effect, abortion legislation increased physicians' power. 
According to historian Janet Farrell Brodie, they did so 
successfully because they "'medicalized' what had not always 
been a medical issue."110 Their status was elevated not only 
because abortion was molded into a moral issue but also the 
publicity created the image that physicians were specialists 
— the authorities of gynecology. 
The physicians' campaign to regulate abortions through 
legislation did not result in the prohibition of abortion. 
In fact, what resulted was a reallocation of the power to 
induce an abortion. The ability to choose an abortion that 
once rested with the woman carrying the embryo now lay with 
the physicians. Abortion legislation spelled out an 
exception to the criminalization of abortion — it was 
110Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 287. 
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acceptable to procure an abortion if the mother's life was 
in danger. Physicians were the group entrusted with the 
power to decide. Ten state laws stipulated that more than 
one physician must agree that an abortion was necessary to 
save the life of the mother. The law in Maryland expressed 
that a "respectable" physician make the proper 
determination, and two states stated that only "regular" 
physicians could authorize an abortion. 
The power to override the abortion prohibition was 
significant in elevating the status of regulars to that of 
moral superior. Physicians, in that respect, had become as 
prestigious as members of the legal profession and the 
clergy.111 They were officially entrusted with the power to 
make life and death decisions. The exception to the law 
itself bolstered the physicians' power to a new level. 
Doctors could provide abortion if they determined it to 
be necessary to save the life of the mother. That fact 
alone symbolizes that, contrary to AMA rhetoric, abortion 
was not an absolute wrong. Storer preached that there was 
to be no latitude even in extreme cases112; ironically, his 
campaign rendered physicians the powerful group alone able 
to make exceptions. Though the AMA emphasized that the 
embryo had the right to life, that right was balanced with 
lxlKristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 32. 
112Storer, Why Not I : A Book for Every Woman, 74. 
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the mother's right to life. The mother's right took 
priority over the life of the developing fetus, a priority 
that physicians recognized, accepted, and arbitrated. 
Not only could they make such a decision, but the 
grounds justifying abortion were vague. The phrase "to save 
the life of the mother" can be read in a variety of ways. 
Life can be assigned a very strict or loose definition. 
Saving the life of the mother could refer to a situation in 
which death is certain and immediate if the pregnancy is 
carried to term. The physician could also consider the long 
term physical well being of the mother. The legislation was 
vague enough to allow considerations that extended beyond 
physical status. A physician was able to consider the 
spiritual, emotional, mental, social, intellectual, and 
financial life of the mother as well. The access to 
abortion by no means ceased, but physicians had the sole 
discretion to determine when abortion was appropriate and 
when it should be forbidden. Not only was the status and 
power of regulars increased by the crusade for abortion 
legislation, but also the physicians could grant abortions 
in a manner consistent with a desire to slow disparities in 
the population growth.113 
Physicians' efforts clearly colored the final phase of 
abortion legislation in the nineteenth century. Other 
factors were also shifting that again increased the 
113Ibid. , 34. 
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perception that abortion needed to be strictly regulated, if 
not fully prohibited. The same press that increased 
abortion's visibility and commercialization ultimately aided 
the effort to regulate abortion. The New York Times 
provides an excellent example. The Times went through 
various phases in its abortion coverage. The attention to 
abortion began in the 1840s by the Times and other urban 
papers as a result of the influential physicians in New 
York. In 1863 the efforts of the AMA sparked an additional 
emphasis on the negative aspects of abortion. It is curious 
that the Times sought to sensationalize abortion stories, 
and to capitalize on the potentially horrific results of 
abortion. The Times had access to numerous tragic and 
timely stories of the destruction of the Civil War. The 
Times reported the death of a woman who sought a surgical 
abortion and declared that it was "high time that the 
attention of the public be directed to the scoundrels who, 
under the pretense of giving relief, entail direct misery 
upon thoughtless women, and at times hurry rash mortals into 
an undesirable eternity."114 
As Madame Restell's business on Greenwich Street 
flourished, the community began to notice. That attention 
was negative in some circles. Samuel Jenks Smith edited the 
114New York Times, January 12, 1863, as cited in Mohr, 
Abortion in America. 177. Mohr also noted that the 
abortionist was not brought to trial as the incident occurred 
before quickening. 
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New York Sunday Morning News and was distressed by Restell's 
activity. On July 7, 1839, Smith's editorial declared that 
Restell's practice "strikes at the root of all social order 
— is subversive of all family peace and quiet — will 
generate jealousies and hate — will demoralize the whole 
mass of society, and make the institution of marriage a mere 
farce." Smith was convinced that "If the laws cannot reach 
her, the voice of the people will; yes, it will call upon 
her in tones of thunder to abandon the nefarious trade in 
which she is engaged, and which she dares to say has never 
resulted in a failure."115 Smith believed his voice inspired 
Restell's arrest in 1839. The charges were dropped as the 
prosecution's case was far from conclusive, and Restell 
continued her activity unchanged until the anti-obscenity 
fervor made room for the tyranny of Anthony Comstock in the 
1870s. 
Abortion law in the 1830s and 1840s was framed in a 
manner that meant any conviction was impossible unless the 
patient's death resulted. As Smith predicted, the law was 
unable to halt Restell's activity, but the newspapers were 
able to influence the attitudes concerning abortion, and the 
AMA's letter campaign influenced the newspaper industry. 
The AMA's campaign and the representation of abortion 
printed in the press increased the sense of urgency and 
115Sunday Morning News, July 7 and 14, 1839, cited in 
Clifford Browder. The Wickedest Woman. 17-18. 
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legitimacy in the anti-abortion campaign. Legislatures 
responded to the environment created concerning abortion. 
The slant appearing in the press significantly altered the 
climate for regulation. The AMA rallied to control the 
presentation of abortion in order to further AMA goals. 
Abandonment of Quickening 
The twenty-year period between 1860 and 1880 witnessed 
a flurry of legislative activity. State and territorial 
legislatures passed forty new and revised abortion statutes. 
Although some common threads ran through the statutes, the 
most significant commonality lies in the abandonment of the 
quickening doctrine. The legislatures were reacting to the 
regular physicians' campaign against abortion. A major 
feature of that campaign was the physicians' assertion that 
gestation was an uninterrupted process. Without 
interferance a human being emerged, and no point in that 
process was more or less significant than any other moment. 
The most crucial moment in the process was conception, all 
other periods of gestation were equally important in the 
formation of an infant. The mother's ability to feel fetal 
movement did not begin the life of the fetus, fertilization 
did. The shift in animation theory was an enormous 
departure from traditional legal, medical, and social 
thought in the United States. The organized regulars were a 
loud voice booming the conception message amongst themselves 
and to their state legislatures. During the late 1860s and 
1870s, medical and scientific knowledge of bacteriology was 
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increasing as was their exposure to laboratory work, 
education, and research. The image of regular physicians 
was improving and their opinion was increasingly 
influential. 
The first major departure from all common law tradition 
was in Connecticut's 1860 law categorizing a woman seeking 
an abortion as criminal. If she attempted to act as her own 
abortionist or if she submitted to the aid of another, the 
woman was subject to a sentence less severe than the 
sentence for her abortionist, but she was punished 
nonetheless. The disparity in sentencing was a remnant of 
the protective spirit of their former legislation. The law 
made abortion a felony with the abortionist facing up to 
five years in prison or a maximum $1000 fine. The law did 
not mention quickening as a distinguishing moment, and 
accomplices to the abortionist were also subject to 
prosecution as felons. Those people responsible for 
distributing abortifacients and advertisements for 
abortifacients faced a fine ranging from $300 to $500. The 
Connecticut law, like the great majority of others passed 
during this period, changed very little during the next 
hundred years.116 
Pennsylvania revised its abortion law in 1860, making 
abortion a crime regardless of whether or not the woman was 
116Quay, "Justifiable Abortion, 454; Mohr, Abortion in 
America, 201-202. 
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pregnant. By removing the issue of pregnancy, the law 
rendered quickening insignificant. Quickening was important 
as it defined pregnancy. Since abortion was criminal with 
or without pregnancy, there was no need to determine if 
quickening had occurred. That removed the burden of proof 
and the question of intention when prosecuting an abortion 
case. The law applied to all attempts, not simply proven 
successes.117 
Several territories responded to the abortion 
legislation activity rampant in the states. The codes 
introduced were reminiscent of earlier lenient provisions, 
but their presence signifies that addressing the issue in 
legislative form was standard. In 1861 the territories of 
Colorado and Nevada criminalized attempted abortions of 
women carrying children. Idaho, Montana, and Arizona 
followed with the same measure in 1864. The territorial 
code was penned in a manner that allowed for confusion in 
attempting to enforce the law. In 1864 Oregon enacted a 
much less ambiguous abortion law and removed quickening from 
the law. The offense was raised to a manslaughter charge in 
instances when the woman was injured and when her health 
remained intact.118 Since the offence remained regardless of 
117Lorenzo D. Bulette, "The Law of Criminal Abortion in 
Pennsylvania," New York Medical Journalf LVII April 29, 1893, 
475-478, and May 6, 1893, 502-508. 
118Mohr, Abortion in America, 202-203; Quay, 11 Justifiable 
Abortion," 452-493. 
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the abortion's effect on the woman's health, manslaughter 
reffered to the action upon the fetus — a major difference 
than the common law acceptance of abortion. 
The deep South's Reconstruction governments joined in 
the abortion reforms typical of the entire United States 
during the period. In 1866 the Alabama legislature 
clarified its former code and increased the sentence facing 
abortionists. In 1868 Florida passed its first piece of 
abortion legislation. Abortion attempts at any period 
regardless of the effects on the woman's health were 
punishable by a maximum $1000 fine or between one and seven 
years in prison. Louisiana followed in 1870 with a revision 
of its abortion code. In addition to criminalizing 
abortifacient medicines, the legislatures outlawed abortions 
using instruments.119 
In 1867 Illinois subjected abortionists to between two 
and ten years of imprisonment. Abortions which proved fatal 
to the woman were considered murder under the new, 
unanimously passed law. The only exception was abortion 
legitimated by therapeutic cause. In 1872 Illinois passed 
another unanimous law. It targeted people disseminating 
abortifacients and advertisements for abortion services. 
The 1872 bill, like the 1867 law, made an exception for 
119Quay, "Justifiable Abortion," 447; Mohr, Abortion in 
America
 f 204-205. 
88 
substances prescribed by "some well known and respectable 
practicing physician."120 
Ohio was still operating under its 1834 law that 
resembled an anti-poisoning measure more than an anti-
abortion law. In 1857 the Supreme Court of Ohio heard the 
case of Edward Robbins v. State of Ohio. Robbins was found 
guilty of first degree murder by a jury at a lower court. 
He provided Nancy Holly with four grains of strychnine in 
order to procure an abortion. The consumption of strychnine 
resulted in Holly's death. The Supreme Court overruled 
Robbins' murder conviction based on his intention in 
providing the substance. The Court ruled, "Where a drug is 
administered to a woman pregnant with a quick child, with 
intent not to kill the woman, but to produce abortion, and 
the woman dies from the effects of the drug, the offense 
cannot constitute murder in the first degree."121 The 
justices determined that though Robbins may have been able 
to be found guilty of something, he was not able to be 
convicted of murder. The intent to abort and the intent to 
murder were not related in the eyes of the court. 
The Ohio state medical society campaigned heavily for 
an anti-abortion law to update the 1834 law. The special 
legislative committee formulating the new bill was inundated 
12
°as cited in Quay, "Justifiable Abortion,", 465, and 
Mohr, Abortion in America. 206. 
121
 Edward Robbins v. The State of Ohio, 8 Ohio ST. 131, 
1857 WL 73 (Ohio, 1857). 
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with materials representing the AMA's beliefs. Horatio 
Storer's major works were among the information presented. 
The committee highlighted information it had determined to 
be accurate. They concluded that abortions in Ohio were 
frequent and families were accustomed to using abortion as a 
means to limit their number of offspring. They also 
determined that in rural and urban areas alike, "there is a 
class of quacks who make child-murder a trade, and we regret 
to add they are too well-patronized and sustained, to a 
considerable extent, by public opinion.11122 
The public support of abortion, they concluded, was 
because the public accepted the quickening distinction. The 
committee obviously now rejected the quickening distinction, 
and supported abandoning it even though their constituents 
seemingly embraced the doctrine. The significance of the 
committee's position was that they were clearly ready to 
impose laws that contained no hint of the common law 
tradition. The influence of the physicians upon the 
legislature appears to have been more significant than the 
tradition among the populace at large. The committee also 
reported that immigrant women aborted less frequently than 
native born women. The committee asked if native-women 
"realize that in avoiding the duties and responsibilities of 
married life, they are, in effect, living in a state of 
122Journal of the Senate of the State of Ohio. . . , 1867 
(Columbus, 1867), Appendix, 233-235, cited in Mohr, Abortion 
in America, 207. 
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legalized prostitution? Shall we permit our broad and 
fertile prairies to be settled only by the children of 
aliens?"123 On this basis the committee urged legislation. 
The bill was born of a distaste for foreign immigrants, not 
of fetal concern. 
The committee's conclusion illustrates three ponits: 
that married women were having abortions, that a nativist 
motivation existed for legislation, and that the physicians 
were more influential than popular opinion. The committee 
also suggested that the physicians' assertions of abortions 
being highly dangerous were accurate. That conclusion seems 
to be contradicted by the seemingly frequent use of abortion 
as a means of family limitation. The safety issue was once 
again twisted in order to support legislation. Safety 
provided a veil for physicians' ulterior motives. 
The reality of nativist concerns was evident in the 
close vote on an amendment that would have prohibited 
abortion for married women only. Single women in a socially 
unacceptable situation would still have had immunity; women 
in that position were often considered to be victims of 
seduction. The legislature was not firmly committed to the 
fetus; it was merely a weak excuse for nativism and 
physicians' control of the procedure. The amendment to the 
original bill failed 14 to 15. The vote was close 
illustrating a significant portion of legislators concerned 
123Ibid. 
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solely about married women, specifically married, native 
women. The amendment failed based on a coalition between 
members opposed to any further restriction on abortion and 
those desiring a restriction on abortion for all women. The 
original bill passed 21 votes to 8 votes without the 
amendment. The resulting bill in 1867 intended to "prevent 
the publication, sale, or gratuitous distribution of drugs, 
medicines and nostrums intended to prevent conception, or 
procure abortion."124 
In 1867 Vermont abandoned the quickening doctrine but 
maintained women's immunity only in cases of self-abortion. 
The law also contained a section addressing the 
advertisement and distribution of abortifacients. The 
practice was no longer allowed. Fines for breaking that 
restriction ranged from $200 to $500.125 
The territory of Colorado revised its abortion code in 
1867. The code added a new twist to the therapeutic 
exception. The law legally justified abortion in instances 
when serious bodily injury was certain. The physicians were 
given the power to make the exception and had more leeway 
than simple instances of life versus death. The physicians 
124Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of 
Ohio.. .
 r 1867 (Columbus, 1867), 561, 594, 703-704, as cited in 
Mohr, Abortion in America, 208-209. 
125Journal of the Senate of the State of Vermont. 1867 
(Montpelier, 1868). 
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room to maneuver within the bounds of the law was expanded 
in Colorado territory.126 
Maryland passed its first piece of legislation 
concerning abortion in 1867. The circumstances surrounding 
the passage of the law demonstrate the regular physicians' 
ability to influence abortion legislation. The law 
prohibited the advertisement of abortion services and 
abortifacients; it also provided rewards to informants. 
Information assistance was essential for the prosecutor to 
have a tight case — the law permitted informant to testify 
as a witness in court. In addition, the bill outlined 
significant punishments for those who acted as an 
abortionist. The section of the law concerning abortion was 
added to a licensing law. It was intended to ensure that 
regular physicians held the dominant position in Maryland. 
The law stifled the ability of irregulars to compete with 
the professionalized class of physicians. Area medical 
societies pushed the legislation, and the result was 
licensing laws and an anti-abortion law in Maryland.127 
In 1867 the New York state medical society gathered and 
compiled a general statement of desire with two specific 
suggestions. The medical society submitted the results to 
126Quay, "Justifiable Abortion," 452; Mohr, Abortion in 
America
 f 211. 
127Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Delegates 
[Maryland]... 1867 (Annapolis, 1867), 829-830, cited in Mohr, 
Abortion in America. 211-213. 
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the committee on public health. In 1868 the legislature 
passed a law that corresponded with one of the physician's 
suggestions — they prohibited the publication of 
advertisements that suggested abortion methods. In 1869 the 
other suggestion received a legislative response. 
The physicians' submission stated that, "from the first 
moment of conception, there is a living creature in the 
process of development to full maturity." They suggest that 
terminating that process is equivalent to murder. They 
continued to state that, "this society will hail with 
gratitude and pleasure, the adoption of any measures... that 
will... arrest this flagrant corruption of morality among 
women, who ought to be and unquestionably are the 
conservators of morals and of virtue."128 Ironically as 
women were revered as the moral fiber of society, they were 
also accused of being parties to murder. There is an 
apparent contradiction in the physicians' philosophy of 
women. If morally superior, women would be able to make an 
appropriate decision about abortion. If women were 
propagating murder, they could no longer be the conservators 
of morality. The contradiction was not apparent to the 
physicians themselves or to the legislators they sought to 
influence. 
128Journal of the Assembly of the State of New York at 
Their Ninety-First Session, 1868 (Albany, 1868), 443-444, 
cited in Mohr, Abortion in America, 216. 
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The physicians encouraged the legislature to drop the 
quickening doctrine, an efforrt that proved successful in 
1869. The law made successful termination of pregnancy, 
regardless of fetal development, second-degree manslaughter. 
Even unsuccessful abortion attempts were made a misdemeanor. 
The traditional loophole was closed when the legislature 
added that it was a misdemeanor whether or not the woman was 
pregnant. The accompanying punishment was between three and 
twelve months in jail or a maximum $1000 fine.129 
New York went even further by fine-tuning restrictions 
on abortion in 1872 when the legislature accepted a 
suggestion made by the Medico-Legal Society of New York. 
Abortion was no longer considered a capital offense. The 
revision was seen as wise, since convictions of an 
abortionist might prove more difficult if they faced capital 
punishment. The revision was not an act of toleration, it 
was viewed as a practical maneuver to increase convictions. 
When a woman consented to a procedure, it was doubtful that 
a jury would call for the death of the person requested to 
perform the procedure. The woman herself was also guilty of 
a felony if she sought an abortion or performed one herself, 
according to the 1872 law.130 
129Cyril C. Means, Jr., "The Law of New York Concerning 
Abortion," 458-490. 
130Quay, "Justifiable Abortion," 501. 
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In 1869 the state legislature dismantled the Bangs 
precedent set by the Massachusetts Supreme Court fifty-seven 
years earlier. Massachusetts revised its law and declared 
that there no longer had to be proof of pregnancy in order 
to successfully prosecute on abortion charges.131 Removing 
the need to prove pregnancy meant the demise of the 
quickening distinction — which had been the main method of 
verifying pregnancy instead of some other irregularity. 
In 1872 California passed a law that paralleled 
Massachusetts's divergence from common law traditions. The 
woman was guilty of a crime if she was her own abortionist 
or if she sought the assistance of an abortionist. The law 
also targeted the person performing the procedure and anyone 
providing the necessary items. The law stipulated that it 
was illegal to attempt to abort any woman. The law did not 
require that she be pregnant. The quickening doctrine was 
no longer good law in California as of 1872.132 
New Jersey revised its 1849 protective abortion law in 
1872. The new law was significant as it made the death of 
the fetus an offense equal to the death of the mother. New 
Jersey legislators clearly accepted the evidence put forward 
by physicians that pregnancy and life began at conception.133 
The following year Nebraska, Virginia, and Minnesota also 
131Mohr, Abortion in America
 r 219. 
132Quay, "Justifiable Abortion," 450. 
85Mohr, Abortion in America, 123-124, 291 at n.14. 
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embraced the concept of pregnancy as a process beginning at 
conception. They all passed laws that removed the 
quickening distinction. Minnesota's 1873 statute also 
criminalized self-abortions, though the woman faced a 
punishment less severe than an abortionist. Her crime was 
considered a misdemeanor while abortionists were deemed 
felons. The laws also contained anti-advertising sections. 
The flurry of increasingly restrictive legislation 
coincided with the strong handed tactics of Anthony 
Comstock. His anti-obscenity crusade began in the 1870s at 
the national level, and was independant of the physicians' 
efforts. In March 1873 Congress passed the Comstock law. 
It affected the abortion industry only in terms of 
advertisements and mail order operations; it was geared to 
halt obscenity in general. Abortion was not the focus of 
Comstockery, though it was at odds with the heavy handed 
legal movement. Comstock was granted the power to enforce 
anti-obscenity regulations for the U.S. postal system and in 
advertising. Restell's demise in April of 1878 was a result 
of his campaign. Restell was arrested and harassed by 
Comstock. She killed herself before the highly publicized 
case came to trial. Comstock's success in derailing 
Restell's service was reliant upon the transformation of 
abortion law. The media latched onto Restell's arrest, and 
the prevailing opinion od abortion in the legislature no 
longer supported Restell's methods. Technically she was 
97 
arrested for breaking anti-obscenity laws in advertisements. 
The power structure's opinion of abortion had labeled it 
obscene. The result was a major victory for Comstockery.134 
In 1875 Arkansas passed a law intending to restrict 
advertisements and to terminate the quickening distinction. 
Attempted abortion became a crime from the point of 
conception. Georgia followed suit in 1876. Attempted 
abortion at any time was made a misdemeanor. Successful 
abortion was equated with murder and was assigned a life 
sentence as the punishment.135 
State legislators between 1860 and 1880 produced 
numerous and increasingly restrictive abortion laws. The 
quickening distinction was regularly removed from the law 
books, and the traditional common law immunity of women was 
vanishing as well. The majority of legislation passed 
during this period was altered very little for almost a 
century. Evidence of the effectiveness of the more 
restrictive legislation is evident in the results of court 
cases following the flurry of legislative activity. The 
physician's campaign to change perceptions of abortion 
proved successful in state legislatures. Legislative 
efforts to restrict abortion and close loopholes in 
prosecution also proved successful in the state courts. The 
134Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 272-288. 
135Quay, "Justifiable Abortion," 46 2; Mohr, Abortion in 
America, 224. 
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alterations increased the number of convictions as the 
prosecutors' burden of proof was reduced. 
The alterations in statutory law after 1880 were 
relatively minor. States did not reshape abortion law, 
choosing instead to refine it. In 1881 Indiana, North 
Carolina, and New York all fine-tuned their abortion law. 
Indiana imposed fines or jail terms on women consenting to 
abortions. North Carolina deemed abortion after quickening 
to be a felony, and abortion at any time illegal. New York 
redefined sentencing in order to curb confusion and 
dissension — capital punishment was deemed to severe for an 
abortionist fufilling a woman's request. The following year 
Iowa raised the jail sentence from one to five years. 
In 1883 Tennessee, Delaware, and South Carolina passed 
abortion statutes that went without alteration for almost 
eight decades. Arizona and Idaho mandated that consenting 
women be charged as criminals. Wyoming followed suit three 
years later. In 1891 Colorado increased the charge facing 
abortionists from manslaughter to murder. Alabama 
significantly increased the potential jail term from between 
three and twelve months to between two and five years. In 
1896 Rhode Island criminalized abortion at any stage of 
gestation but maintained the woman's common law immunity. 
Such revisions concluded abortion law tinkering for almost a 
century. During the same period as the final alterations, 
the courts revealed an acceptance of the new philosophy 
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governing conception and abortion. The criminal courts had 
traditionally been lenient in interpreting abortion laws, 
but they were beginning to demonstrate a willingness to give 
the benefit of doubt to the prosecution. 
The legislative trend reduced much of the pressure on 
the prosecution. As the automatic loophole provided by 
quickening was plugged in the legislatures, the courts 
accepted the shifting burden of proof. Prosecutors no 
longer had to prove pregnancy or quickening in order to 
successfully convict. The defense was forced to prove that 
the abortion was medically necessary in order to be 
acquitted. The Colorado supreme court determined in 1872 
that simply intending to procure abortion, regardless of 
success, was enough to convict an abortionist. 
In the 1880 case of State v. Slagle, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed the invalidity of the quickening 
doctrine. The court ruled that, "it is not the murder of a 
living child which constitutes the offense, but the 
destruction of gestation by wicked means and against 
nature."136 The same year the New York Supreme Court 
determined that quickening was no longer something that had 
to be proven. The prosecution's job was simply to establish 
that an abortion had occurred. In order to be found not 
guilty, the abortionist was forced to prove that the 
abortion was necessary. 
136State v. Slagle, 82 N.C. , 653, (N.C., 1880). 
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In 1882 the Massachusetts Supreme Court heard 
Commonwealth v. Taylor. The court articulated that there 
was no need for the prosecutor to prove pregnancy or 
quickening. The court's main concern was no longer whether 
or not the woman was pregnant or quickened. The court was 
more concerned with the fact that abortion had been 
attempted. The Taylor precedent overruled the same court's 
Commonwealth v. Bangs ruling in 1812. Once replaced the 
precedent died. The Bangs case clearly articulated the 
common law theory that without proof of quickening, 
pregnancy could not be established, therefore, procuring 
abortion before quickening was not criminal. Bangs was 
decided solely on the fact that there was no proof of 
quickening, thus of pregnancy. The Taylor case, by 
contrast, was unaffected by the woman's stage of gestation 
or proof of pregnancy. In a seventy-year period the theory 
of abortion and its law underwent a complete 
transformation.137 
Several cases represent the new willingness of the 
courts to accept uncorroborated testimony by a woman also 
implicated in the criminal case. In People v. Vedder, an 
1884 New York case, the judge allowed the woman's testimony 
alone to convict the abortionist and the man that supported 
her decision to abort. The complete acceptance of the 
137Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882); 
Commonwealth v. Bangs. 9 Mass. 369 (1812). 
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woman's testimony was interesting since she no longer 
benefitted from her common law immunity. In 1892 the 
Massachusetts supreme court came to the same conclusion and 
determined the unsubstantiated testimony by a woman also 
criminally liable would be accepted in court. 
Another example of the drastic changes in the outcome 
of abortion cases was in Gus A. Eggart v. the State of 
Florida. The Florida supreme court convicted Eggart in 1898 
simply because he suggested an abortifacient. He was 
convicted even though his suggestion was not used.138 The 
court also reiterated that pregnancy and quickening were not 
material to the case. The courts were clearly demonstrating 
a tightening in abortion law based on legislation. Courts 
were also displaying a willingness to provide the prosecutor 
with the benefit of doubt where they had once made 
convictions near impossible. The court originally favored 
the case of the abortionist based on the difficulty of 
proving pregnancy and quickening. Intent was extremely 
difficult to establish and that had historically favored the 
accused. The transformation in abortion law altered that 
leniency. Increasingly the court accepted questionable 
evidence and placed the burden of proving necessity on the 
abortionist. As the possibility of successfully prosecuting 
an abortion increased, the laws became more meaningful. 
138People v. Vedder, New York, 1885, quoted in Mohr, 
Abortion in America , 235-237, 311. 
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Legislatures removed language in statutes that provided an 
escape route for abortionists. 
Conclusion 
At a lecture in 1868, Dr. Anne Densmore announced that 
abortion at any stage of gestation was murder. Some women 
listening fainted at the notion that they may have 
participated in murderous activity.139 This illustrates the 
attitude common in America concerning abortion in the mid-
nineteenth century. Under the common law transplanted from 
England, abortion prior to quickening was not considered a 
crime, or even a deplorable act. Several changes occurred 
across the nineteenth century to alter that perception. One 
major factor was the activity of physicians desiring to 
establish dominance in the field of medical service. 
Physicians adopted abortion as a campaign. They 
challenged the notion that life began upon noticeable fetal 
movement and announced that pregnancy was a continual 
process that began at conception. The result, if 
uninterrupted, was life. The physicians were outspoken 
about their belief. Their opinions infiltrated journals and 
editorial pages. They successfully sought to enlist the aid 
of state legislatures and clergy to reinform people's 
abortion perspective. Animation at conception was not the 
139Mohr, Abortion in America, 73. 
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only factor motivating physicians; they hoped to boost their 
prestige and be classified as moral authorities. With 
increased prestige the physicians would be closer to 
dominating the medical field and reducing competition from 
"irregulars" including homeopaths and midwives. "Regular" 
physicians as moral authorities would be considered morally 
superior to "irregulars" willing to perform abortions. 
Other social factors aided the physicians' campaign and 
supplied increased motivation to alter the common law of 
abortion. Notions of native superiority cleared the path 
for a movement among the most powerful segments of society. 
Abortions in the 1840s became increasingly common among 
wealthy married women. Abortions had formerly been a 
recourse for the single woman shamed by pregnancy. By the 
1840s that stigma had changed; wives were seeking abortions 
and it was no longer simply an alternative for the 
desperate. It had become a form of limiting the size of a 
family. 
This shift sent a Shockwave through minds of Americans 
that feared the alteration of traditional familial roles. 
Lower classes and the immigrant population were procreating 
at a more rapid pace than native born Americans. Concerns 
about the population disparity fueled the drive to restrict 
abortions. Anti-abortion theorists held that WASP women 
would match the procreation rate of "unsavories" if access 
to abortion and abortifacients was denied at law. 
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Population concerns were personal to regular physicians as 
they were among the segment of the population that was 
potentially going to be outbred. Increased 
commercialization, and thus visibility, of the abortion 
phenomenon mutually reinforced the surge in abortions. All 
these issues increased sensitivity to abortion and created 
an environment favorable for restrictive legislation. 
These factors enabled and propelled the transition in 
abortion legislation. Common law accepted abortions prior 
to quickening as benign, and even post quickening abortions 
were simply considered misdemeanors. Initial legislation 
sought to protect women from potentially fraudulent and 
dangerous commercial abortionists. Gradually legislation 
abandoned the quickening distinction. The result was more 
viable prosecutions since it had been virtually impossible 
to establish that quickening had occurred. Eventually the 
prosecutor's case was no longer affected by the success of 
the abortion or the issue of pregnancy. Even the 
advertisement of abortion services became illegal with the 
advent of Comstockery. Abortion and abortifacients were 
labeled "obscene." The most significant legislative shift 
dealt with women's liability. Lawmakers stripped women's 
immunity to prosecution for consenting to an abortion and 
performing the procedure themselves. Abortion laws were 
developed as a means to protect women, as the transformation 
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progressed, protection of women was abandoned and the 
legislation targeted women. 
The emergence of the therapeutic exception was also 
significant. It empowered the very group that sought an 
absolute prohibition of abortion to sanction the act. 
Physicians had defined abortion as an absolute wrong. The 
result of their campaign was contradictory to their stated 
abortion philosophy. Abortion was only conditionally wrong, 
and physicians were the only group allowed to make that 
determination. If abortion was absolutely wrong, then 
physicians would not need the power to make exceptions. 
What seemed like a limited power to determine necessity 
actually increased physicians' power significantly. An 
exception was possible if necessary to save the life of the 
mother. Such a determination was made using a wide range of 
criteria — was quality of life a factor? Also, how 
damaging would a pregnancy have to be to the mother to 
warrant an abortion — could it be made only in instances of 
certain death or would the physician make an exception if 
permanent physical injury were imminent? The ability to 
make exceptions rested with physicians, and the wide variety 
of ways to interpret the issue meant a certain diversity in 
physicians' decisions. The ability to interpret the issue 
and decide if an abortion was to be allowed was empowering. 
The physicians gained an exclusive and significant power. 
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The aberration in American abortion history was 
motivated by several interests — some genuine and some 
self-serving, as well as racist, and class-based. The 
increased prominence of the AMA and the domination of 
medical services was furthered by the physicians' 
involvement in the anti-abortion campaign. The traditional 
family, and the WASP family in particular, was also 
bolstered. The fear that WASP culture would be overrun and 
tainted by foreign influences had a definite impact on the 
willingness of Americans in power positions to tighten 
abortion restrictions. If there was not a way to mandate 
that certain people not procreate, then the natives must be 
forced to produce WASP babies and replenish native stock in 
the United States. The impulses to restrict abortion were 
far deeper than a moral desire to preserve fetal life. 
There were more odious intentions grounded in physicians' 
economic interests and a superiority complex toward more 
recent immigrants. 
Social factors created an environment conducive to the 
legislative shift, though society in general did not propel 
the change in law. The physicians lobbied state 
legislatures and filled newspapers with editorials. 
Physicians in many instances had direct influence in the 
penning of statutes. They were extremely public with their 
desire to restrict abortion, and their language triggered 
people's fear and sensitivities. By mid-century the 
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physicians' impulse worked its way into state legislatures. 
The courts, which had traditionally been firmly committed to 
tenets of the common law, were forced to follow the 
statutory change. The legislative shift was dramatic and 
lasted for nearly a century. 
The shift drove abortion underground unless sanctioned 
by physicians as a medical necessity. The shift marked a 
dramatic break from the common law position on abortion at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. For almost a 
century the abortion law in the United States was at odds 
with the common law commitment to legal abortions early in 
gestation. Abortion legislation underwent a second dramatic 
shift in 1972. In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme 
Court supported a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. 
This right was articulated in such a manner that it 
resembled the common law quickening tradition. The woman's 
right diminished as gestation progressed. The aberration in 
abortion legislation lasted between ninety and one hundred 
years; it was driven by the physicians' campaign. Both 
quickening and the trimester system laid out by Justice 
Harry Blackmun define an increase in fetal rights and a 
decrease in maternal rights as the fetus develops.140 
Certainly advances in medical knowledge have changed 
the abortion issue immensely, but the quickening distinction 
has been a factor in the American abortion consciousness. 
14
°Roe l. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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It is ironic that physicians as a group did not oppose the 
1972 liberalization of abortion laws given their influence 
in the first American transformation of abortion law. 
Physicians gained status and significantly reduced medical 
competition with the first jurisprudential swing. Certainly 
some physicians have gained economically from the second 
shift. Another alteration in the abortion debate since the 
transformation in the nineteenth century is that women 
gained a political voice. During the dwindling adherence to 
quickening under pressure from the medical profession, women 
were not empowered with a vote. As the twentieth century 
progressed, women's voice in the abortion issue has led to 
increasing public fervor on both sides of the debate. 
Given the resemblance between the common law stance and 
the present stance on abortion, the virtual prohibition of 
legal abortions is an aberration in U.S. jurisprudence. In 
order that such an exception occur the medical profession 
exerted significant influence — and ultimately increased 
their collective power. Societal conditions were ripe for 
embracing the physicians' rhetoric given the nativist 
sentiment swarming in the country. The anti-abortion 
crusade that buried the quickening distinction was motivated 
by a great deal more than a moral concern for fetal rights. 
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